Ukraine’s electronic warfare (EW) systems have become more effective against Russian Kinzhal missiles; Russia forced to spend billions on countermeasures
Executive summary
Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) units — notably the Lima system operated by the Night Watch unit — are reported to have increased success in disrupting Russia’s Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, with operators claiming they have diverted roughly a dozen Kinzhals by spoofing satellite guidance signals [1] [2] [3]. Ukrainian sources and analysts say Moscow has spent heavily to harden its munitions (including installing CRPA antennas) and that Russia has “already spent at least $1.5 billion” on countermeasures, according to reporting citing the General Staff [3].
1. Breakthrough or incremental advantage? What operators say
Field operators and Ukrainian outlets describe Lima as a tailored EW tool that can overpower a missile’s satellite-correction channel with a fabricated signal — symbolically encoded with a patriotic song in several accounts — causing Kinzhals to lose satellite guidance and veer off course [1] [2] [4]. Defense Express and other Ukrainian sources report that EW effectiveness improved in 2025 and attribute an uptick in Kinzhal misses to these systems [5] [3] [6].
2. How the spoofing reportedly works — the technical claim
Multiple reports explain that Kinzhals use inertial navigation supplemented by satellite updates; operators say Lima can inject a stronger, false GNSS (GPS/GLONASS) data stream so the missile applies wrong corrections and accumulates error, leaving it to inertial navigation that degrades over distance [1] [5] [4]. Analysts quoted in these pieces stress that any structured false signal would have the same effect — the music is rhetorical, not causal [5] [7].
3. Independent corroboration and expert caution in sources
Some international commentators and former officials see the development as important: The Economist cited a former German defense official who called the work a potential “breakthrough” in EW that could extend beyond Kinzhals to guided bombs [2] [7]. At the same time, the reporting itself notes technical caveats — jamming effectiveness depends on exposure time, missile altitude and trajectory, and adversary fixes — implying the effect is conditional, not absolute [5] [7].
4. Russia’s response and the money already spent
Defense Express cites a General Staff estimate that Russia has spent at least $1.5 billion on countermeasures, much of it on installing controlled radiation pattern antenna (CRPA) systems on munitions to resist spoofing [3]. That figure appears in Ukrainian-sourced reporting and frames the countermeasure spending as substantial; the exact breakdown and independent verification of the $1.5 billion figure are not provided in the materials [3].
5. Operational context: why Kinzhal might be vulnerable
Reports point out that the Kinzhal’s high speed and long glide phase can be a double-edged sword: the faster the weapon travels, the more its cumulative inertial error grows without reliable satellite updates, making it theoretically more sensitive to GNSS spoofing if those updates are denied or falsified [3] [5]. Some pieces also note that Kinzhals flying higher and farther may be easier targets for focused jamming than shorter, steeper trajectories like Iskanders [5].
6. What the sources do not report or confirm
Available sources do not mention independent, open-source statistical verification that quantifies the share of Kinzhals diverted versus those that strike targets; nor do they include Russian official technical admissions beyond countermeasure spending claims [3]. There is no open-source, peer-reviewed test data in these items proving the Lima system’s claimed rates of success beyond field operator statements and Ukrainian reporting [1] [2] [4].
7. Competing narratives and potential agendas
Ukrainian military outlets and operators have an incentive to publicize EW successes for morale and deterrence; Western commentators highlighting a “breakthrough” may emphasize the story’s strategic value [2] [7]. Conversely, Russian state reporting continues to describe Kinzhal strikes and operational use in routine summaries, reflecting an alternative narrative of continued effectiveness [8] [9]. Readers should treat battlefield claims as signals in a propaganda-contested environment and weigh them against independent verification [3] [10].
8. What to watch next — verifiable indicators
Useful follow-ups in open reporting would be independent strike assessments showing missile impact patterns consistent with navigation failure, Russian technical bulletins describing hardened GNSS/CRPA rollouts, or third-party analysis quantifying how many Kinzhals have missed intended targets over time. Current sources point to increasing EW effectiveness and significant Russian countermeasure spending but stop short of providing fully independent proof of a systemic, durable defeat of the Kinzhal [6] [3] [10].