Keep Factually independent
Whether you agree or disagree with our analysis, these conversations matter for democracy. We don't take money from political groups - even a $5 donation helps us keep it that way.
How do accession criteria (Article 10, MAP, interoperability) apply to Ukraine and which members insist on stricter benchmarks?
Executive summary
Ukraine’s accession negotiations formally opened on 25 June 2024 and by September 2025 had completed the Commission’s chapter screening, with the Commission saying Ukraine is ready to open remaining clusters and the 2025 Enlargement Package noting “significant progress” [1] [2]. Key accession tests — Article 49/Article 10 political criteria (rule of law, democracy, human rights), the Copenhagen economic and institutional benchmarks (often tracked via the negotiating clusters/MAP-style screening) and practical interoperability (digital, defence, administrative) — are being applied through the Commission’s screening, Enlargement Package and targeted EU support programmes [2] [3] [4]. Several member-states have signalled they will insist on strict benchmarks — Hungary has publicly blocked or delayed steps and framed accession as requiring further guarantees, while many capitals and the Commission emphasise a merit-based, unanimous Council decision-making process [5] [6] [2].
1. Article 10 and political conditionality: what the EU is testing
Article 10 TEU and the political pillars of the Copenhagen criteria are enforced through the Commission’s annual enlargement reporting and the screening process: the 2025 Enlargement Package assesses rule of law, democratic institutions and fundamental rights and makes opening or closing chapters conditional on measurable reforms [2] [7]. The Commission’s reports and the EU’s screening of negotiating chapters treat political benchmarks — judiciary independence, anti-corruption, media pluralism and minority rights — as prerequisites for opening clusters or adopting interim benchmarks, and they remain central to the “merit-based” approach the Commission says it follows [2] [8].
2. The Membership Assessment Process (screening / clusters / MAP-like steps)
Accession for Ukraine follows the standard multi-stage process: Commission screening of chapters, opening of negotiating clusters, then stepwise opening/closing of chapters once interim benchmarks are met. Brussels completed bilateral screening for Ukraine’s chapters by September 2025 and the Commission expects Ukraine to meet conditions to open remaining clusters; Council unanimity of all 27 member states remains required at each key step [3] [6] [2].
3. Interoperability — digital, administrative and defence angles being measured
Interoperability is now an explicit, tangible test. The EU is supporting Ukraine to align eID, trust services and registry interoperability (notably via DT4UA, e-Governance Academy support and Resolution No. 689 on digital ID wallets) and the Commission’s regulatory tools foresee integrated, interoperable information systems and automatic recognition of some Ukrainian electronic signatures from 2027 — concrete markers of technical alignment the EU will treat as part of the accession path [4] [9] [10] [11]. Defence and industrial interoperability are also in scope through EU initiatives (SAFE, military mobility and readiness roadmaps) that stress joint procurement and interoperable systems — these raise practical standards beyond law alignment [12] [13] [14].
4. Member states insisting on stricter benchmarks — who and why
Hungary is the clearest publicly recorded holdout: Budapest has used its veto power to block procedural steps, arguing concerns about “integrating war” and signalling it will demand additional guarantees, effectively raising de facto benchmarks beyond Commission recommendations [5]. Other member states have not been named in the provided sources as single veto-holders but the Commission and Council repeatedly underscore that every step requires unanimity and that capitals expect a “merit-based” approach; this structure gives any member leverage to press for stricter benchmarks on rule of law, migration, labour mobility and economic safeguards [6] [2].
5. Tension between speed and conditionality — competing perspectives
EU institutions and many member capitals (and Ukraine) press for rapid progress on merit-based grounds — noting completed screening and reform roadmaps — while critics, notably Hungary, argue national security or political considerations should slow openings. The Commission frames the approach as both supportive (funding, audit boards, technical projects) and conditional (benchmarks, monitoring), a dual stance that puts results and unanimity at the centre of next steps [2] [15] [4].
6. What to watch next — practical markers and political spoilers
Watch Commission cluster recommendations and the Council’s unanimity votes, the Commission’s next enlargement reports, delivery on Ukraine’s rule-of-law and anti-corruption roadmaps, and technical interoperability milestones (eID recognition, TREMBITA registry links, DT4UA outputs). Political spoilers include continued bilateral blocks (Hungary) or any member raising new conditions tied to security, migration or defence procurement that could effectively ratchet up benchmarks beyond the Commission’s roadmap [2] [16] [5].
Limitations: available sources document Commission reports, EU programmes and Hungary’s public objections, but they do not catalogue every member-state position or any private bilateral demands — those “stricter benchmark” claims beyond Hungary are not detailed in the provided reporting (not found in current reporting).