How are we still involved overseas in direct combat under trump
Executive summary
The United States continues to engage in direct combat operations overseas under President Trump through a mix of kinetic strikes, special operations raids, and concentrated naval and air deployments that have targeted drug-trafficking vessels, Iran-aligned groups, extremist organizations, and Venezuelan government assets; these actions have included lethal maritime strikes, a CIA drone strike inside Venezuela, and air campaigns such as strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen [1] [2]. Legal and institutional lines—Congressional notification rules, the War Powers framework, and the long-standing use of special operations—have been bent or bypassed according to reporting and official patterns from this administration [3] [4] [5].
1. Kinetic maritime and island campaigns: lethal strikes on vessels and regional buildups
Since September the administration has carried out a sustained campaign of lethal maritime strikes in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific against vessels it says are tied to drug trafficking and Venezuelan state-linked networks, with reporting documenting dozens of vessels struck and scores of casualties as part of what the White House framed as a major interdiction effort and regional buildup of naval assets under SOUTHCOM [1] [6] [3].
2. Direct action inside Venezuela and the use of the CIA for strikes
Reporting shows the U.S. has moved beyond interdiction in international waters to operations inside Venezuela, including a CIA drone strike on a port facility and a high-profile capture of President Nicolás Maduro—actions the administration authorized and which appear not to have followed traditional Congressional authorization for use of force in Venezuela, prompting members of Congress to seek prohibitory legislation [2] [3].
3. High-end kinetic strikes elsewhere: Yemen, Somalia, and beyond
The Trump administration authorized an air campaign against Iran‑backed Houthis in Yemen that employed long-range cruise and glide munitions and cost over $1 billion in a month before an Oman-mediated ceasefire, and it launched strikes against Islamic State elements in Somalia—demonstrating continued use of high-end conventional munitions and long‑reach strike authorities across multiple theaters [1].
4. Special operations and a lowered political cost for raids
Special operations forces continue to be a preferred tool for the administration’s direct-combat posture: JSOC and other elite units have been used for raids historically and in this period, and commentators warn the administration treats SOF as a political panacea—authorizing raids without clear long‑term transition plans and relying on them to accomplish strategic goals while shifting political risk from large-scale troop deployments to deniable, targeted actions [5] [7].
5. Congressional notification, legal friction, and institutional erosion
Multiple outlets note that the administration has whittled away prior notification requirements to Congress and in at least one instance lawmakers were not notified in advance of the Venezuela operation, spurring questions about compliance with the War Powers Resolution and longstanding notification norms; Congress has pursued legislation to prohibit the use of funds for force in Venezuela without authorization, reflecting institutional pushback [3] [4].
6. Posture, messaging, and the politics of force
The administration’s public framing—describing “massive armadas,” arranging large regional deployments of ships and tens of thousands of service members, and touting decisive kinetic actions—serves multiple political aims: deterrence, domestic messaging about toughness on drugs and foreign adversaries, and the creation of operational options for limited strikes rather than protracted occupations; critics argue this produces escalation risk, ambiguity about targets and authorities, and a tendency to favor flashy tactical wins over coherent long-term strategy [6] [1] [5].
7. What’s unresolved in reporting
Open questions remain about the full legal basis for particular strikes inside sovereign territory (beyond the reporting that Congressional notification was not provided), the detailed chain of command for CIA versus DoD strike authorities in new operations, and the operational thresholds the administration uses to move from presence to direct lethal action—reporting documents actions and trends but cannot fully reveal classified decision-making or all legal rationales [3] [2] [5].