How are US troop levels and missions in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan affecting regional security and relations with Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Russia, Iran, and Turkey?
Executive summary
U.S. troop levels in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan have been drawn down in a phased, conditions-based way: roughly 2,500 U.S. troops were in Iraq at the start of 2025 with fewer than 2,000 expected after drawdown moves, Syria hosted under 2,000 (often cited as above 900 earlier in 2025), and Afghanistan levels have fallen sharply since 2021 though reporting on current exact counts is uneven [1] [2] [3]. Analysts and regional governments say the shifts are reshaping counter‑ISIS operations, Iraqi‑Syrian security cooperation, and great‑power influence — with competing views about whether reduced U.S. footprints increase risks of ISIS resurgence or merely formalize a transition to local and bilateral security roles [4] [3] [5].
1. How the drawdowns are changing the counter‑ISIS fight
The U.S. transition in Iraq moves the coalition from a multilateral Operation Inherent Resolve model to bilateral security partnerships, consolidating forces (many toward Erbil/Kurdistan) and ending the coalition mission inside Iraq by September 2025 while sustaining Syria‑focused operations from Iraq into 2026 — an evolution meant to keep pressure on ISIS remnants but reduce legacy coalition footprints [6] [7] [8]. Experts warn Islamic State affiliates remain adaptive and dispersed; the group now relies on autonomous regional affiliates (notably IS‑K in Afghanistan) and retains detention and prison‑break risks in northeast Syria, meaning fewer foreign troops does not eliminate the threat [5] [9].
2. Iraq: sovereignty, security partnerships, and militia politics
Baghdad and Washington agreed to wind down the coalition mission in Iraq in 2024 and begin a phased withdrawal, prompting U.S. force consolidation and a shift to bilateral arrangements; by late 2025 officials expected fewer than 2,000 U.S. personnel concentrated more in Kurdistan to support Syria operations [6] [3] [10]. Iraqi leaders see the move as a sovereignty win but fear spillover from Syria and the political influence of Iran‑aligned militias — a dynamic that makes U.S. basing and training still politically sensitive and a potential flashpoint with militias that have previously targeted foreign forces [11] [12].
3. Syria: partnerships, basing shifts and great‑power room to maneuver
U.S. forces in northeast Syria have supported the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against ISIS and guarded detention sites and oil fields; reported reductions and conditional withdrawals have raised SDF concerns and opened political space for Russia and Iran to recalibrate influence, even as some analysts argue a U.S. pullback simply formalizes a longer transition and leaves counter‑ISIS tasks to local partners with U.S. support from Iraq [13] [2] [14]. Commentators note a U.S. exit could give Tehran and Moscow opportunities to expand logistical and diplomatic reach — but other reporting shows post‑Assad realtime politics in Damascus may also constrain those actors and create novel cooperative options with Baghdad [14] [15] [16].
4. Afghanistan: limited public data, persistent regional threats
Public reporting on current U.S. troop numbers in Afghanistan has been sporadic; past drawdowns reduced U.S. forces dramatically, and counterterrorism concerns now focus on IS‑K and the Taliban’s posture toward other groups. The sources in this set emphasize that affiliates like IS‑K remain a serious regional threat and that withdrawals limit direct U.S. counterterrorism leverage while underscoring the need for regional intelligence and cooperation [5] [17]. Available sources do not mention precise current U.S. troop counts in Afghanistan in 2025 in this collection.
5. Russia, Iran and Turkey: winners, losers and hedging strategies
Analysts diverge: some say a reduced U.S. presence in Syria and Iraq gives Iran strategic breathing room to rebuild supply lines and proxy ties; others say Assad’s fall and shifting politics have weakened Iran’s levers and opened opportunities for Russia to recalibrate its footprint — Moscow has at times reduced forces or sought new arrangements with local actors [18] [14] [19]. Turkey is simultaneously wary of U.S. support for Kurdish forces and courting pragmatic ties with both the U.S. and regional players; Ankara positions itself as a mediator while also pursuing its own security aims vis‑à‑vis Kurdish groups and Iran [14] [20] [21].
6. Bottom line: balance of risk and the politics of transition
The official U.S. approach in 2024–2025 frames drawdowns as a transition to bilateral, condition‑based partnerships that preserve counter‑ISIS capacity while responding to Iraqi sovereignty demands [7] [8]. Yet multiple sources stress a tradeoff: fewer foreign troops may reduce a “magnet” for attacks and honor Iraqi politics, but they also shift more responsibility onto local forces and regional diplomacy at a moment when ISIS affiliates remain resilient and regional competition among Iran, Russia and Turkey is intensifying — meaning the outcomes depend on the quality of bilateral security ties, intelligence sharing, and political stabilization efforts now under negotiation [4] [9] [22].
Limitations: reporting in this set varies by date and focus; precise troop counts fluctuate and are sometimes withheld in public documents, so some assertions about exact current numbers are based on the most recently cited figures in these sources [1] [2] [3].