Which Venezuelan regions are controlled by dissident ELN, FARC dissidents, or local bandas?
Executive summary
A patchwork of Venezuelan territory is contested and in some places effectively controlled by Colombian-origin armed groups and local criminal bandas: the ELN holds sway in large stretches of the Colombia–Venezuela frontier (notably Catatumbo and border municipalities of Apure and Arauca), FARC dissident factions operate deep inside southern and eastern Venezuelan states (Amazonas, Bolívar and the Orinoco delta), and locally rooted sindicatos or bandas dominate riverine trafficking corridors and some coastal pockets — though precise maps of “control” vary by source and over time [1] [2] [3].
1. Borderlands: ELN’s strongest footholds in Catatumbo, Apure and Arauca
The National Liberation Army (ELN) has consolidated significant control along the northeastern and western borderlands: Catatumbo (a Colombian region abutting Venezuela) figures as an ELN stronghold from which fighters push across the frontier, and Venezuela’s Apure and Arauca border zones have seen pitched fights between ELN units and FARC dissidents as the ELN seeks dominance of drug and smuggling routes [1] [4] [5]. Multiple investigations report the ELN’s bid for a near-monopoly on non-state armed activity along long stretches of the border, with tens of thousands displaced in recent confrontations and the group directly challenging other dissident fronts for territory once held by FARC structures [1] [6].
2. The southern flank: Amazonas and Bolívar — dissidents, illicit mining and mobility
FARC dissidents and ELN elements operate freely in Venezuela’s southern states: Amazonas hosts armed dissident formations linked to ex-FARC commanders that use the remote jungle for movement and to exploit illicit economies, while Bolívar’s illegal gold-mining zones are a core revenue source for the ELN and allied groups, placing both sets of Colombian rebels deep inside Venezuelan territory [7] [8] [6]. Researchers and human-rights monitors document not merely transit but settled presence — camps, checkpoints and economic control tied to mining and trafficking — complicating Caracas’s capacity to assert exclusive state control [7] [8].
3. The Orinoco corridor and eastern riverine zones: FARC dissidents and local bandas
East of the Orinoco delta — in Delta Amacuro, parts of Monagas and river towns like Piacoa — reporting identifies FARC dissidents and Venezuela-based bandas (including the Barrancas sindicato) exercising control over fluvial routes, passenger traffic and narcotics flows; communities describe uniformed armed men who operate as de facto authorities along the waterways from Piacoa eastward [3]. These river corridors are critical because they connect inland extractive zones with coastal outlets and are contested by Venezuelan criminal syndicates as well as Colombian dissident groups, producing localized governance by armed actors rather than the state [3].
4. Urban, coastal and organized‑crime pockets: sindicatos, bandas and hybrid arrangements
Beyond Colombian rebel footprints, Venezuelan sindicatos — long-standing organized‑crime bands — and local bandas run urban and peri‑urban trafficking, extortion and checkpoint systems that either coexist with or face pressure from ELN and FARC dissidents; in some areas the ELN has supplanted sindicatos, while in others clientelistic or coercive alliances blur lines between “foreign” rebels and homegrown criminal networks [8] [6]. U.S. and open‑source assessments argue that the ELN’s reach now spans dozens of municipalities across multiple states, whereas FARC dissidents remain more geographically concentrated but entrenched in strategic corridors [2] [9].
5. What “control” means — and the limits of the reporting
“Control” here ranges from periodic operational dominance and taxation of local economies to sustained territorial governance with checkpoints, recruitment and revenue extraction; sources differ on scale and dates (some documenting escalations through 2024–2025), and independent, up‑to‑date mapping of municipal‑level control is limited, so assertions should be read as the best available synthesis rather than immutable boundaries [1] [2] [7]. Reporting also highlights competing narratives and political incentives — accusations that Caracas tolerates or collaborates with some groups serve geopolitical arguments used by Bogotá and Washington, while Venezuelan authorities contest or downplay these characterizations — underscoring the need to triangulate local testimony, NGO investigations and security data [2] [6].