How did U.S. War Plan Red compare, step‑by‑step, with Canada’s Defence Scheme No. 1?
Executive summary
Both plans were contingency warbooks drafted in the interwar era: Canada’s Defence Scheme No. 1 directed audacious pre‑emptive “flying column” strikes into the northern United States to buy time for Imperial reinforcements, while the U.S. War Plan Red (approved 1930) mapped a multi‑front invasion of Canada (sub‑plan “Crimson”) to neutralize the dominion as a British staging ground; each assumed rapid, decisive moves rather than protracted occupation and both were rendered obsolete as Anglo‑American relations warmed and World War II reshaped priorities [1] [2] [3].
1. Origins and strategic logic: mirror images born of the same fear
Defence Scheme No. 1 was drafted by Lt.‑Col. James “Buster” Sutherland Brown in 1921 as a Canadian response to the possibility that the United States might act against Canada or that Britain would need Canada to be defensible; Brown framed offence as the best defence and planned raids to disrupt U.S. mobilization [1] [2]. War Plan Red emerged in the late 1920s and was approved in 1930 by the Joint Army and Navy Board as an American contingency against the British Empire that treated Canada as the logical theatre to strike first to deny Britain a North American foothold [2] [4]. Both plans reflect the interwar anxiety about shifting global power and the practical geography that put population and industry close to the border [3] [5].
2. Step‑by‑step: opening moves and strategic objectives compared
Canada’s Defence Scheme No. 1 prescribed immediate surprise incursions—“flying columns” rushing to seize border cities such as Seattle, Great Falls, Minneapolis and Albany—aimed at diverting U.S. forces and destroying lines of communication before Canadian forces withdrew to defensible positions and sabotaged bridges and railways to delay pursuit [2] [1]. By contrast, War Plan Red outlined a full‑scale American invasion on several axes—New England (to take Montreal and Quebec), the North Dakota/Midwest axis (to seize Winnipeg and mineral/industrial regions) and simultaneous naval operations to seize the Great Lakes and blockade Atlantic and Pacific ports—seeking to capture key ports, railheads and resources (including Niagara hydroelectric facilities) to force a rapid collapse of Canadian/British resistance [2] [4].
3. Tactics, logistics and operational assumptions: where plans diverged and mirrored each other
Tactically both plans prioritized speed, seizure of transport nodes and disruption: Brown’s light, mobile columns relied on surprise and sabotage given Canada’s manpower disadvantage, while U.S. planners envisioned large‑scale, coordinated ground and naval operations with detailed maps, road accounting and major war games to rehearse advances [6] [7] [4]. The Americans assumed naval supremacy would be contested and that control of the Great Lakes and blockades would be decisive; Canadian planners relied on the assumption—ultimately flawed—that British Imperial forces would reinforce Canada in time [4] [2]. Each plan thereby embedded risky assumptions about allies, logistics and public reaction [6] [8].
4. Feasibility, contemporary critiques and why both were shelved
Scholars and contemporaries later judged Defence Scheme No. 1 quixotic or suicidal—Brown did not coordinate with London and over‑relied on Imperial relief that Britain had privately concluded it could not provide—while War Plan Red’s planners underestimated the Royal Navy’s capacity and daunting Canadian geography and climate for logistics [1] [4] [6]. Both became historical curiosities after declassification (U.S. files in 1974) and the rise of closer Anglo‑American cooperation in the late 1930s and WWII [9] [10]. Criticism also includes domestic agendas: Canadian anxieties about American absorption and American concerns about British debt and global posture shaped the perceived need for contingency planning [3] [11].
5. Political context, secrecy and the legacy: contingency plans, not policy
Neither plan signalled imminent hostility between neighbors; they were secret contingency studies driven by worst‑case thinking, military culture and interwar geopolitics rather than immediate government intent, and both were later declassified and treated as curiosities illustrating how thin diplomatic certainties once were [9] [12]. Alternative interpretations exist—some read them as evidence of mutual paranoia and imperial hangovers, others as prudent planning exercises—but the sources make clear the plans rested on contested assumptions, were never executed, and were overtaken by the political reality that Britain and the United States became partners rather than adversaries [8] [13].