How have prior wargames or scenario exercises influenced actual policy and force posture in the U.S., China, and NATO?
Executive summary
Wargames over the last decade have repeatedly signaled shortfalls in U.S. readiness and prompted calls for changes in posture, procurement, and alliance planning, while also shaping Chinese and NATO signaling and exercises in ways that sometimes amplify escalation risks [1] [2] [3]. Yet wargames are not neutral predictors — they reflect sponsoring organizations’ assumptions and can be used as advocacy tools to justify force structure, industrial policy, and diplomatic stances [4] [5].
1. U.S. policy: from scenario findings to procurement and posture proposals
Across multiple public wargames, analysts have recommended concrete U.S. responses — stockpiling long‑range precision munitions, dispersing air bases, hardening infrastructure, and investing undersea and attritable systems — and those recommendations feed directly into debates over programs like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and joint warfighting concepts that emphasize countering anti‑access/area‑denial (A2/AD) challenges [1] [2] [6]. Wargame outputs that showed high attrition and the difficulty of short, decisive victories prompted military leaders and some think tanks to push for modernization, altered basing, and joint concepts such as the Joint Warfighting Concept and expanded maneuver by 2030 [7] [6] [8].
2. U.S. force posture: practical changes and the limits of wargame influence
Simulations’ repeated warnings about munitions shortages, recruiting declines, and industrial shortfalls have been cited by analysts arguing for larger inventories and industrial mobilization, but institutional and political constraints have limited wholesale change; critics argue that some wargames rest on optimistic or selective assumptions and therefore overstate feasible responses [9] [5]. In short, wargames provide concrete templates for force posture—more forward basing, distributed operations, and partner integration—but translating those templates into sustained funding and force design remains contested [1] [2].
3. NATO and allied behavior: exercises, reassurance, and signaling
NATO’s stepped‑up exercises in Eastern Europe and expanded participation in Indo‑Pacific exercises reflect a reciprocal logic: Western wargames that highlight Russian or Chinese capabilities help justify larger multinational drills and closer interoperability with vulnerable states, while allied deployments themselves become part of deterrence signaling and posture adjustments [3] [10]. However, some commentators see these moves as escalating tensions and serving domestic political agendas or defense industry interests that benefit from heightened threat narratives [4] [10].
4. China: learning, rehearsal, and strategic signaling
Chinese large‑scale exercises and wargames serve both operational learning and messaging functions; Reuters and other reporting show Beijing using drills as diplomatic and propaganda tools, while Western assessments of PLA improvements in wargames have pressured U.S. planners to rethink assumptions about campaign length and Chinese operational art [3] [11]. Open analyses of multiple wargames also document a regressive trend in U.S. and Taiwanese chances over time, a finding that Chinese planners likely study even as it drives U.S. and allied modernization debates [11].
5. What wargames reveal — and what they obscure
Scholars and practitioners caution that wargames reveal as much about sponsors’ preferences and policy aims as they do about hard military truth: games can be used to lobby for industrialization, export policy, or specific force constructs, and they often omit political, economic, and escalation dynamics that would reshape real conflicts, including nuclear thresholds [4] [5]. Wargames that focus narrowly on kinetic outcomes can underplay non‑kinetic tools, domestic political will, and logistical realities that in practice determine whether posture changes are sustainable [7] [5].
6. Downstream effects: doctrine, budgeting, and public debate
Even when wargame results are not determinative, they influence doctrine debates, congressional funding priorities, and public talking points — think tanks’ published games feed hearings and modernization arguments, while military‑sponsored simulations inform joint concepts and training emphases [1] [2]. At the same time, adversaries and allies read those outputs; analysts warn that heavy emphasis on worst‑case kinetic scenarios can entrench a cycle of militarization and mutual signaling that raises the risk of miscalculation [4] [10].
Conclusion
Prior wargames have meaningfully shifted policy conversations and nudged force posture across the United States, NATO, and China by exposing capability gaps, recommending materiel and basing fixes, and legitimizing alliance exercises, but their influence is mediated by politics, budgets, and the agendas of sponsors; moreover, games can both clarify risks and amplify threat narratives that complicate crisis stability [1] [4] [2].