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Which countries have operated the Saab Gripen and later switched to or considered the F-35, and why?
Executive summary
A small group of countries that have operated or leased Saab Gripen have at times reconsidered, reduced, or debated procuring the Lockheed Martin F‑35; the clearest recent example in the sources is Canada, which signed for F‑35s but has reopened talks with Saab about buying Gripen and even building them in Canada [1] [2] [3]. Other Gripen operators (Sweden, Czech Republic, Hungary, Brazil) remain Gripen users while many NATO countries operate or ordered the F‑35 — but available sources do not show a pattern of former Gripen operators switching to the F‑35 in large numbers [4] [5] [6] [7].
1. How the Gripen–F‑35 debate shows up in procurement politics
Canada is the clearest case where a country that evaluated the Gripen and contracted for F‑35s has publicly reopened consideration of Saab’s jet: Ottawa signed a contract for 88 F‑35s in January 2023 but only funded an initial batch of 16 and has since been reviewing alternatives and holding talks with Saab about Gripen E/Fs and local assembly [1] [2] [3]. Reporting describes active political lobbying on both sides — retired Canadian officers defending the F‑35 purchase and Saab selling industrial jobs and sovereignty arguments [8] [9].
2. Why countries consider switching or mixing fleets: capability, cost and sovereignty
Sources show three recurring rationales: operational capability (stealth, sensor fusion, and NORAD/NATO interoperability favour the F‑35), lower purchase and lifecycle costs plus austere‑field flexibility favour the Gripen, and industrial/sovereignty benefits (technology transfer, domestic assembly) motivate governments to consider alternatives to U.S. supply chains [10] [2] [3] [11]. Analysts warn that a mixed‑fleet approach raises training, logistics and integration costs and could complicate alliance defence arrangements [12] [13] [14].
3. Which Gripen operators have also operated or ordered the F‑35?
Available sources list Gripen operators — Sweden, Czech Republic (leased C/D), Hungary, Brazil — and separate lists of F‑35 operators, but they do not present any country that fully operated the Gripen and then later shifted wholesale to the F‑35 as a settled pattern in the reporting provided [4] [7] [6]. The Czech Republic is using Gripens on NATO duties while also planning for future F‑35 deliveries in some accounts, but sources frame that as sequential coexistence or transition planning rather than a completed swap [6] [7].
4. Portugal and other NATO members: reconsideration, not finished decisions
Several NATO members (Portugal and possibly others) have publicly reconsidered F‑35 plans and eyed European alternatives including Gripen; reporting frames these as active reassessments rather than completed switches, and Saab is using such political openings to press industrial offers [6] [15]. The coverage stresses geopolitical drivers — foreign policy shifts, tariffs and alliance frictions — that prompted some governments to reopen procurement debates [15] [11].
5. The practical barriers to switching from Gripen to F‑35 or vice versa
Analysts and editorial pieces in the sources stress high practical costs: mixed fleets multiply training, simulators, spares and maintenance; NORAD/NATO integration leans on shared platforms; and timelines matter because replacing retiring fleets late would create capability gaps [13] [12] [14]. These arguments are used both to defend sticking with the F‑35 and to caution against rapid pivots to Gripen despite its lower operating costs [10] [13].
6. Competing narratives and vested interests in the reporting
Saab and pro‑Gripen commentators highlight affordability, quick delivery, and sovereignty through local assembly [2] [3]. F‑35 advocates — retired officers, some pundits and editorial pages — stress stealth, sensor fusion, and alliance interoperability, and warn that switching risks operational gaps [8] [10] [13]. Readers should note those institutional incentives: Saab seeks market share and industrial deals; F‑35 backers emphasize alliance cohesion and existing investment protection [9] [13].
7. Bottom line and limitations of available reporting
The best‑documented contemporary example is Canada’s unresolved debate and Saab’s renewed pitch to supply or co‑produce Gripen alongside a limited F‑35 commitment [1] [2] [3]. Available sources do not document many cases of former Gripen operators definitively switching to the F‑35, nor do they confirm a broad global trend of one‑for‑one replacements — reporting instead shows active competition, political pressure and long procurement timelines where outcomes remain uncertain [4] [7] [6].