If God is everywhere, why doesn’t he stop horrible things from happening to people?

1. How the question is framed—and why it matters for theology and philosophy

The core claim embedded in the question is that if God is everywhere (omnipresent) and all‑powerful and all‑good, then God should be able and willing to stop all horrible events; the persistence of such events therefore challenges one or more divine attributes. Philosophers label this the problem of evil, and it has driven centuries of debate about logical inconsistency versus evidential difficulty ^{[4] [3]}. The question matters because the response determines whether one revises beliefs about God’s nature, attributes human freedom primacy, or accepts that human reasoning has limits in divine matters. Sources present the problem both as a puzzle in analytic philosophy and as a pastoral existential crisis in religious communities, showing it is simultaneously theoretical and urgently practical ^{[4] [5]}.

2. Theodicies that try to defend God’s allowance of suffering

Theodicies attempt systematic justifications for why a good God might permit evil. Leading explanations include the free will defense—moral evil results from genuine human freedom which is intrinsically valuable; soul‑building or John Hick‑style developmental theodicy—suffering fosters moral and spiritual growth; and Augustinian accounts—evils are privations or consequences of a fall ^{[2] [6]}. Contemporary theological essays also argue God permits some evils to realize greater goods, such as virtues like courage, compassion, and relational depth, or to fulfill redemptive narratives central to Christianity ^{[1] [7]}. These views converge on one claim: omnipresence does not entail constant intervention; divine allowance can be purposeful and oriented toward goods that could not exist without certain hardships ^{[1] [2]}.

3. Philosophical pushback: where theodicies struggle with real-world horror

Critics press two lines of objection: logical and evidential. The logical problem asks whether the trio of divine attributes and the existence of evil are logically incompatible; many philosophers argue they are not strictly inconsistent but remain deeply problematic ^[3]. The evidential problem focuses on the magnitude and character of suffering—systemic atrocities, prolonged natural disasters, and apparently gratuitous pain that seem excessive relative to any plausible greater good. Skeptics point out that while theodicies may account for some suffering, they often fail to explain extreme cases (e.g., genocides, child suffering) without invoking inscrutable divine reasons, which some regard as unsatisfactory or evasive ^{[2] [8]}.

4. Religious readings that emphasize presence, response, and eschatology

Many religious traditions refract the question through narrative and pastoral lenses: God’s presence is emphasized amid suffering rather than the immediate cessation of evil; biblical exemplars (Job, Jesus’ passion) model divine solidarity or redemptive transformation rather than simple interventionist remedies ^{[7] [5]}. Theological answers therefore combine comfort and future hope: divine empathy, promised justice in an afterlife, and transformative meaning assigned to suffering. Christian sources in particular emphasize the cross as God’s participation in human suffering and eventual victory over evil—an answer oriented to ultimate resolution rather than immediate prevention ^{[7] [9]}.

5. Empirical, moral, and pastoral considerations that the debate often omits

Academic debates sometimes underweight empirical and pastoral realities: how communities actually respond to suffering, how institutional power or neglect contributes to preventable harms, and how theology interacts with ethics and public policy. Important omitted considerations include the role of human systems (political, economic), which can be reformed to reduce certain evils, and the psychological needs of sufferers who require concrete assistance more than speculative theodicies. Sources show theodicy can risk appearing abstract if it does not also prioritize actionable compassion and structural change alongside metaphysical explanation ^{[8] [9]}.

6. Synthesis: what can be reliably said and where uncertainty remains

Factually, the problem of evil remains an unsettled philosophical and theological issue with robust and competing responses: theodicies (free will, soul‑making, privation accounts), defenses stressing mystery or divine purposes, and critiques highlighting explanatory gaps—especially for extreme suffering ^{[1] [2] [3]}. What is clear from the literature is that no single account commands universal acceptance; answers mix ethical, metaphysical, and pastoral moves. For many people the decisive factors are not abstract arguments but how religious communities embody presence, justice, and practical aid in the face of horror—areas where theology and action intersect and where empirical reform can reduce avoidable evil ^{[5] [8]}.