What steps have China and India taken to regulate exports of fentanyl precursors and how effective have those measures been?
Executive summary
China and India have both tightened controls over fentanyl-related substances and precursors in recent years, with China implementing class-wide scheduling in 2019 and successive export licensing and control measures, and India expanding domestic scheduling and enforcement actions after being identified as an emerging source by U.S. agencies [1] [2] [3]. Those measures have reduced some direct flows from China but produced displacement effects—new precursors, substitution chemistries, and shifts of manufacturing and logistics to India and other jurisdictions—that limit overall effectiveness [4] [1] [3].
1. China: from permissive exports to class‑wide controls and tighter export licensing
Beijing moved decisively in 2019 to impose class‑wide controls over fentanyl-related substances after sustained pressure from the United States, a policy shift that reportedly curtailed China’s direct share of illicit fentanyl production destined for North America [1] [5]. Since then China has expanded its control lists, tightened supervision across multiple ministries (public security, commerce, customs, medical products) and announced export‑license requirements for a set of precursor chemicals to countries including the U.S., Mexico and Canada [2] [6]. Official Chinese statements emphasize multi‑agency supervision and “striking hard” against manufacturing and smuggling of fentanyl‑related chemicals [2].
2. How well China’s measures have worked — successes and limits
The immediate result of China’s 2019 scheduling was a decline in direct shipments of scheduled fentanyl and some precursors to the United States, and increased cooperation with foreign law enforcement according to U.S. and Chinese accounts [1] [7]. But traffickers adapted: manufacturers in China developed alternative precursors and pre‑precursors that initially remained unscheduled, and exporters advertised non‑scheduled inputs online, preserving avenues for diversion [4] [5]. Analysts and U.S. agencies conclude that Chinese controls reshaped, rather than eliminated, global supply chains—reducing one route while incentivizing substitution and geographic diffusion [4] [1].
3. India: stepped‑up scheduling and enforcement after displacement
Evidence from DEA and investigative reporting shows that as China tightened controls, some production and precursor sourcing shifted to India and India‑based suspects partnered with Mexican traffickers to synthesize and export IMF (illicitly manufactured fentanyl), prompting India to strengthen domestic controls and law enforcement actions in response to international pressure [3] [8] [1]. Academic and policy analyses recommend class‑wide scheduling in India as well and urge public‑health measures to reduce demand, indicating Indian legislative responses have been discussed though implementation and scope vary [9] [8].
4. Effectiveness in India — continuing vulnerabilities and enforcement realities
Reports and case studies show Indian laboratories and networks filled gaps left by China’s restrictions, with seizures and arrests linked to precursor shipments and synthesis in India, demonstrating both the country’s role in new trafficking patterns and limits of enforcement [8] [3]. At the same time, comparative law enforcement assessments caution that India’s regulatory framework and the dual‑use nature of many chemicals make complete prevention difficult: unscheduled pre‑precursors and legitimate industrial demand create loopholes that traffickers exploit [1] [4].
5. The bigger picture: substitution, supply‑chain adaptation, and international cooperation
Both governments’ measures have meaningful impacts by raising transaction costs, enabling seizures, and signaling political will, but they are countered by technical chemistry answers—new precursors, mislabeling, and relocation of synthesis—and by fragmented global scheduling that cannot keep pace with chemical innovation [4] [5] [10]. U.S. and multilateral efforts emphasize information‑sharing, export licensing, and training to reduce diversion, but analysts warn unilateral pressure can produce displacement rather than elimination without coordinated global controls and demand‑reduction strategies [7] [10].
6. Conclusion — partial wins, persistent adaptation, and policy implications
China’s class‑wide scheduling and export controls have demonstrably disrupted established flows and forced adaptations, and India has become a focal point for traffickers and therefore a target of new domestic and cooperative countermeasures, yet neither country’s steps have fully stanch
ed the global spread of illicit fentanyl because of chemical substitution, online marketing of unscheduled inputs, and gaps in international scheduling and enforcement [1] [4] [5]. The evidence suggests regulation reduces some supply routes and enables seizures, but sustaining impact requires coordinated global scheduling, tighter export controls on dual‑use chemicals, robust information sharing, and complementary public‑health measures to reduce demand [7] [9].