How did Senate rules change in 1975 regarding the 60-vote threshold for nominations?

1. How the rule actually changed: a numeric and textual shift

In 1917 the Senate adopted Rule XXII to permit cloture by two‑thirds, but in 1975 the body revised its cloture standard so that three‑fifths of “senators duly chosen and sworn” could invoke cloture—effectively lowering the required count to 60 in a 100‑member chamber ^{[1] [2]}. Multiple institutional histories and policy briefs summarize this as the 1975 vote that produced the three‑fifths/60‑vote benchmark now invoked in public debate ^{[1] [2]}.

2. What changed in practice beyond the number: two‑track and the end of the talking filibuster

Contemporaneous mid‑1970s reforms also introduced procedural practices—often called “two‑track” operation—that allowed the Senate to shelve a matter and proceed to other business while a filibuster threat remained, removing the need for senators to physically hold the floor for hours or days to block action ^{[3] [4]}. The combination of lowering the cloture number and adopting two‑track made the filibuster mechanistically easier to wield: fewer senators could effectively stop progress without the stamina of the historical “talking filibuster” ^{[3] [4]}.

3. How people interpret the change: a de facto supermajority for legislation

Analysts and advocacy groups present the 1975 revision as the moment the filibuster acquired a de facto 60‑vote requirement for most legislation: because cloture is the normal route to end debate, a 60‑vote cloture threshold means many bills must secure 60 votes to be brought to a final vote under regular procedures ^{[2] [4]}. Think tanks and watchdogs use that fact to explain why Senate majorities often turn to reconciliation or other workarounds that can pass with a simple majority ^[2].

4. What the rule did not do: it left Rule XXII’s text and other exceptions intact

Institutional accounts note that the textual change was framed as shifting from two‑thirds of those “present and voting” to three‑fifths of all “duly chosen and sworn,” and that certain categories (like changing standing rules) still require different thresholds in practice; the rule text itself and other precedents remained relevant to specific situations ^{[5] [6]}. Sources also stress that later Senate decisions and precedents — not just the 1975 vote — shaped how cloture is applied to nominations and legislation ^{[5] [6]}.

5. Subsequent carve‑outs and the erosion of the 60‑vote norm for nominations

Later parliamentary moves changed how the cloture norm applies to nominations: the “nuclear option” precedents in the 2010s and beyond removed the 60‑vote hurdle for most executive and lower‑court nominations such that those confirmations can proceed with a simple majority, even though Rule XXII’s nominal wording was not wholesale rewritten at that moment ^{[5] [7]}. Sources emphasize that the 1975 change did not foresee those later, politically contested modifications ^{[5] [7]}.

6. Two competing narratives about intent and consequence

Reform advocates frame 1975 as a pragmatic fix to an unattainable two‑thirds rule and part of a modernization that would make the Senate more workable ^{[1] [3]}. Critics and many modern commentators argue the combined effect of 1975 and subsequent practices transformed the chamber’s operation by entrenching a 60‑vote de facto veto for large swaths of legislation and empowering a sustained minority block ^{[2] [4]}. Both perspectives appear across official Senate histories and policy commentary ^{[1] [2]}.

Limitations and sourcing note: this account relies on the provided institutional histories and policy analyses; available sources do not mention detailed floor transcripts of the 1975 debate in this packet and do not resolve every textual nuance of Rule XXII beyond the summaries cited ^{[1] [2]}.