Fact check: Which demographic groups had the lowest voter turnout in the 2024 election?

1. Young Voters Dropped Back — A Consistent Theme Across Studies

Multiple analyses identify 18–29-year-olds as the demographic with markedly lower participation in 2024, repeating a well-documented pattern of youth turnout volatility. National surveys conducted in 2024 and synthesized in post-election reports found that a sizable share of young adults reported dislike of both major candidates and lower intent to vote compared with 2020, with one pre-election analysis noting an 8-point decline in planned turnout among this group ^[4]. Later PRRI work and exit-poll synthesis corroborate that non-voters skewed younger, making youth the clearest single demographic with lower turnout ^{[2] [1]}.

2. Race and Ethnicity: Non-White Groups Were Disproportionately Absent

Analysts and survey organizations reported that Black, Hispanic, and certain Asian subgroups were more prevalent among non-voters than among actual voters, indicating lower relative turnout for these populations. The PRRI survey quantified that non-voters in 2024 were disproportionately minority racial groups, a pattern echoed in exit-poll interpretation that minority turnout lagged national averages in many areas ^{[2] [1]}. State-level reporting also found turnout declines in less competitive jurisdictions, where minority voters often face compounded barriers, further depressing participation rates ^[5].

3. Education and Income: Lower Socioeconomic Status Predicted Non-Participation

Post-election analyses show a clear correlation between lower educational attainment, lower household income, and reduced turnout in 2024. PRRI’s breakdown identified non-voters as skewing toward lower education and income brackets, and exit-poll cross-tabs implied similar patterns when comparing voter composition to population benchmarks ^{[2] [1]}. This socioeconomic gap aligns with longstanding turnout research: people without college degrees and with fewer financial resources were less likely to vote, contributing to the demographic profile of the lowest-turnout groups in 2024 ^{[1] [2]}.

4. Geography and Competitiveness Complicated the Picture

Turnout was not uniform across states: competitive battlegrounds kept high participation, while less-contested states and districts saw declines, which interacted with demographic composition to change turnout patterns. Reports from late 2025 noted that turnout remained strong where races were tight, but fell in noncompetitive states—areas that often have different demographic mixes, including older and whiter electorates or regions with entrenched turnout obstacles for minorities and young people ^{[5] [3]}. These spatial differences mean national averages can obscure local demographic shortfalls.

5. Survey Timing and Methodology Produced Varied Estimates — Read the Caveats

Different data sources use different methods—exit polls, pre- and post-election surveys, and administrative turnout rates—and each has limits that affect which groups appear underrepresented. Exit-poll synthesis provides demographic voting patterns but cannot alone establish turnout rates for the eligible population without registration or census benchmarks ^[1]. PRRI’s post-election surveys and national turnout reports triangulate lower participation among youth, minorities, and lower-SES groups, but sampling frames, response bias, and timing (published across 2024–2025) mean precise margins vary between sources ^{[2] [3]}.

6. Political Context and Engagement Signals Help Explain Why

Analysts noted explanatory signals that align with the turnout gaps: candidate dislike among young voters, lower mobilization efforts in some communities, and the dampening effect of noncompetitive races on turnout. Pre-election polling highlighted youth disengagement tied to candidate antipathy, while post-election analyses point to mobilization differentials and structural barriers as factors behind lower participation among minorities and lower-income voters ^{[4] [2] [3]}. These proximate causes do not change the turnout facts, but they clarify mechanisms linking demographics to lower turnout.

7. What Multiple Sources Agree On — And Where They Diverge

Across the body of work from 2024–2025, there is broad agreement that younger adults, racial minorities, and lower-SES citizens comprised much of the non-voting population; disagreement centers on magnitude and state-by-state variability. Exit-poll analyses and national turnout reports converge on the identity of low-turnout groups, while PRRI and other surveys provide finer-grained sociodemographic detail; divergence arises mainly from methodological differences and the role of geographic competitiveness in modulating turnout ^{[1] [2] [5]}.

8. Bottom Line for Researchers and Policymakers

The combined evidence from exit-poll synthesis, national turnout reviews, and targeted surveys published between 2024 and 2025 indicates that efforts to raise turnout should prioritize outreach to young adults, minority communities, and lower-income/less-educated voters, and must account for local competitiveness and structural barriers. Policymakers, civic groups, and analysts should treat the 2024 turnout patterns as both a reaffirmation of known participation gaps and a call to refine data collection and targeted interventions where the shortfalls were largest ^{[3] [2]}.