How did the 2024 European Parliament elections change the balance of power between center‑right and far‑right groups?
Executive summary
The 2024 European Parliament elections produced a clear rightward shift: far‑right and radical‑right parties increased their vote share and seat count to historically high levels while the centre‑right European People’s Party (EPP) remained the largest single group and, together with other pro‑EU centre groups, preserved a working majority [1] [2] [3]. The practical balance of power therefore moved toward a stronger far‑right presence—larger numbers, new group formations and greater committee leverage—but not to an immediate takeover of plenary control thanks to the EPP’s continued primacy and a still‑intact centrist bloc [4] [2] [5].
1. A measurable rightward shift: votes and seats
The elections delivered measurable gains for radical and populist right parties: analyses estimate the far‑right share rose from roughly a fifth to about a quarter of the vote, translating into a record number of far‑right MEPs—figures reported include roughly 25–27% of votes and claims of 187 MEPs described as “hard right” or roughly a quarter of the 720 seats [1] [6] [4]. Multiple datasets and commentators underline that the shift was driven both by far‑right surges in key countries and by losses among Greens and Liberals, which amplified right‑leaning group gains in seat terms [1] [5].
2. Centre‑right resilience: the EPP’s continued dominance
Despite the surge on the right, the EPP emerged as the largest parliamentary group and marginally strengthened its position relative to the previous term, enabling centrist alliances to retain a working majority across the chamber [2] [3]. That majority was decisive politically: it allowed Ursula von der Leyen, an EPP politician, to secure re‑election as Commission President and kept centre‑right nominations competitive for institutional posts, illustrating that numerical far‑right gains did not immediately translate into control of EU institutions [4] [2].
3. Fragmentation and the limits of far‑right power
The far right’s numerical gains were offset by fragmentation: multiple far‑right parties either formed new small groups or remained “homeless” after expulsions and splits, notably the AfD’s expulsion and the creation of new formations such as Europe of Sovereign Nations/ESN and movements exploring alternative groupings [4] [1] [5]. Analysts and think tanks stressed that policy disunity—on economics, foreign policy and EU integration—limits the ability of the far right to convert larger presence into coherent legislative power [7] [8].
4. Institutional influence: committees, posts and bargaining leverage
Where numerical strength translated into concrete leverage was in committee chairs, rapporteurships and Parliament posts: ECR nominees and other right‑leaning figures gained positions that had previously been denied, and distribution of roles followed relative strength, giving the right enhanced agenda‑setting power even without a majority to impose policy [3]. Observers warned the rightward tilt will affect procedures and priorities—shaping file assignments, budget scrutiny and debate tone—even if substantive Commission policy still requires cross‑bloc coalitions [9] [3].
5. Political consequences and the cliff‑edge scenario
The election’s practical consequence is a more polarized, fragmented Parliament in which the centre must decide whether to fence off or engage parties to its right; that choice will determine whether the far right becomes kingmaker or remains a louder but divided opposition [9] [7]. National fallout—snap national elections in France, governmental stresses in Germany and coalition recalibrations—amplified the systemic effects of the EP results, demonstrating how European‑level gains translated into domestic political crises [10] [11].
6. Bottom line: shift without seizure
In sum, the 2024 EP elections shifted the balance of power by substantially increasing far‑right representation and leverage, but they stopped short of displacing the centre‑right’s institutional leadership or ending the pro‑EU centrist majority; whether that balance hardens into lasting policy influence depends on far‑right unity, centre‑right engagement choices, and post‑election bargaining over committees and Commission support [4] [2] [9].