Which demographic groups were most responsible for the 2024 turnout decline compared with 2020, and what do surveys say about their reasons for not voting?

Checked on January 30, 2026
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Executive summary

The turnout decline from 2020 to 2024 was concentrated among younger voters, many voters of color (notably Hispanic voters), and irregular or less-educated voters — patterns analysts say tilted turnout away from the Democratic coalition that helped in 2020 [1] [2] [3]. Available post‑election surveys and organizational analyses document who stayed home and point to a mix of administrative barriers, lower enthusiasm than in 2020, and patterns of irregular participation, but the excerpts supplied do not include comprehensive, self‑reported reasons from a consolidated national survey [1] [4] [3].

1. Young voters: the single biggest demographic driver of the drop

Multiple post‑election analyses find youth turnout fell from 2020 to 2024 and that this decline was a major contributor to the overall drop; CIRCLE reports youth participation was “slightly lower than in 2020,” with stark intra‑youth variation (for example, 58% for young white women vs. 25% for young Black men) and warned before the election about registration shortfalls among the youngest voters [1] [5]. Pew’s validated‑voter work confirms younger cohorts were less consistent between elections, noting small but consequential differences in turnout among young voters who supported competing candidates in 2020 [6]. Catalist also flags young voters and “irregular” voters as central to the shift away from 2020 Democratic margins [3].

2. Voters of color — especially Hispanic turnout — declined and mattered

National tabulations show turnout declined across racial and ethnic groups in 2024, with Hispanic voters recording one of the largest percentage drops (a roughly 3.1 point fall in Census‑based tabulations) and Black turnout down about three points from 2020, according to USAFacts’ synthesis of Census data [2]. Catalist’s voter‑file analysis ties those turnout declines among people of color to the erosion of the 2020 Democratic coalition, observing that losses among “people of color” were interconnected with declines among youth and irregular voters [3].

3. Education, disability and irregular participation: structural gaps

The Census CPS tables show a steep turnout gradient by educational attainment in 2024 — for example, roughly 82.5% of those with advanced degrees voted versus about 52.5% of high‑school graduates — indicating lower turnout among the less‑educated remained a structural factor [7]. USAFacts also documents lower participation for people with disabilities versus those without, pointing to administrative and accessibility gaps that depress turnout among certain subgroups [2]. Analysts note that the aggregate decline reflects not just fewer Democratic‑leaning voters turning out, but the persistence of long‑standing participation gaps tied to education and civic access [7] [3].

4. Geography and the battlegrounds: where declines translated into impact

State‑level turnout shifts mattered unevenly: Ballotpedia and Election Lab summaries show several states with substantially lower turnout in 2024 than 2020 (for example, Hawaii, Oklahoma, Arkansas, West Virginia, Texas among the lowest turnout states), and reporting highlights that Democrats’ relative turnout advantage in 2020 narrowed in many battlegrounds — a dynamic Catalist and Split Ticket link to Trump’s victory margins [8] [3] [9]. Analysts caution that 2020 was an unusually high baseline in many places, so some of 2024’s decline reflects reversion toward more typical levels rather than a permanent collapse [4].

5. What surveys say about the reasons — and the limits of available reporting

The sources provided document who failed to vote and point to plausible drivers — registration problems and lower youth registration rates flagged by CIRCLE, diminished enthusiasm compared with 2020 noted by PPIC, and a pattern of irregular participation highlighted by Catalist — but the excerpts do not include a single, detailed roster of self‑reported reasons from national surveys compiled here [1] [4] [3]. In short: reporting points to administrative barriers for the youngest voters, weaker motivation/enthusiasm relative to the unusually mobilizing 2020 environment, and persistent access gaps for lower‑education and disabled citizens [1] [4] [7], yet the supplied materials lack a consolidated list of respondents’ own explanations broken down by demographic group — a gap that requires consulting full PRRI, Pew or Census CPS‑supplement questionnaires and toplines for definitive attribution [10] [6] [7].

Want to dive deeper?
How did registration and administrative barriers vary by state for 18‑ to 24‑year‑olds in 2024?
What do PRRI and Pew post‑election surveys report about self‑declared reasons nonvoters gave in 2024?
Which turnout declines in 2024 had the biggest effect in specific swing states (state‑level Catalist or Election Lab breakdowns)?