Which demographic groups saw the largest increase in voter turnout in 2024?
Executive summary
Validated analyses show 2024 did not produce a uniform surge in turnout across the population; instead the largest turnout gains were concentrated among white voters and among higher-education and higher-income cohorts, while younger voters and many racial and ethnic minority groups saw stagnation or declines relative to 2020 [1] [2] [3] [4]. Multiple researchers emphasize that differential partisan turnout — with Republican-leaning eligible voters turning out at higher rates in 2024 — was a primary driver of the election outcome rather than mass switching of partisan loyalties [1].
1. White voters: the clearest group with measurable gains
Comprehensive post‑election estimates find that white turnout rose relative to some earlier benchmarks and was a notable driver of 2024 dynamics; analysts report white turnout in 2024 was several percentage points higher than in 2008 and that shifts among white naturalized citizens were substantial enough to move vote shares [2] [1]. Pew’s validated‑voter work also shows changes in naturalized white voters’ choices between 2020 and 2024 — a movement driven “primarily by changes in turnout” — which underscores that increased white participation, rather than wholesale switching, mattered [1].
2. Higher‑education and higher‑income voters turned out at high rates
Census CPS Voting and Registration tables show turnout rose with educational attainment, with people holding advanced degrees voting at markedly higher rates (82.5%) than high school graduates (52.5%), indicating the largest relative participation was among the most educated — a longstanding pattern reinforced in 2024 [3]. PRRI and other post‑election surveys also document overrepresentation of higher‑income adults among voters compared with nonvoters, signaling turnout advantages for higher‑income groups [5].
3. Republican‑leaning and certain naturalized voters—differential turnout, not mass switching
Pew’s analysis concludes that differential partisan turnout — Republican‑leaning eligible voters being more likely to cast ballots in 2024 — played a larger role than broad partisan switching, and that increases in turnout among some naturalized groups helped the Republican candidate’s performance [1]. Wikipedia and AP exit‑poll summaries similarly report that many demographic groups swung toward the Republican nominee in 2024, often tied to turnout shifts rather than sheer conversion [6] [7].
4. Youth and many minority groups saw declines or weak turnout gains
Youth turnout fell from its 2020 levels in multiple estimates: CIRCLE’s post‑2024 work puts youth turnout in the low‑to‑mid 40s (42–47% depending on measure), a marked drop from estimates of 2020 youth participation [4]. Census and USAFacts data report declines in turnout for several racial and ethnic groups in 2024, with Hispanic turnout noted as the largest percentage drop among measured groups in some series [3] [8]. These patterns produced commentary about a widening racial turnout gap in 2024 [2].
5. National totals and the broader context: high by historical standards but down from 2020
Official‑style aggregates show 2024 turnout was among the highest in recent history (mid‑60s percent of eligible or voting‑age populations), yet slightly below 2020’s record highs — meaning some groups increased turnout relative to pre‑2020 norms even as overall turnout dipped from the pandemic‑era peak [3] [9]. Analysts caution that the headline story is not a single surge but a rearrangement: gains concentrated in certain demographics (white, higher‑educated, higher‑income, and Republican‑leaning voters) and declines among youth and some minority groups [1] [4] [2].
6. Limits, alternative interpretations and what the sources don’t settle
The available sources converge on differential turnout as decisive, yet they differ in magnitude and in some subgroup estimates — exit polls, validated‑voter panels, CPS supplements and independent turnout reconstructions use different denominators and methods, producing variation in reported gains and declines [1] [3] [9]. Where assertions go beyond those data (for example, precise state‑level shifts for every subgroup or causal attribution to a single campaign tactic) the reporting here does not have validated evidence; readers should treat cross‑study differences as meaningful rather than dismissing any single headline.