Is there post nov 4, 2025 election analysis claiming that american voters blamed the "big beautiful bill" for causing health insurance premiums to rise?

1. What claims appear in the supplied summaries that matter for this question — and how they differ from what you asked about

The supplied analyses repeatedly claim that the legislative package nicknamed the “One Big Beautiful Bill” or “Big, ‘Beautiful’ Bill” was projected by analysts to increase costs for people on Medicaid, ACA marketplaces, Medicare, and employer plans; they frame the legislation as likely to make health care more expensive for many Americans ^{[2] [3]}. Several summaries highlight that commentators and policy groups warned about premium increases and reduced coverage under the proposal, but the texts are clear that these are policy impact projections or advocacy analyses made before an election, not post‑election surveys attributing voter blame. The distinction matters: predicting premium effects is not the same as reporting that voters, after an election, said the bill was to blame for observed premium rises ^{[1] [6]}.

2. Timing matters: why none of the provided sources meets the “post‑Nov 4, 2025 election analysis” threshold

Multiple supplied items carry dates in mid‑2025 or are explicitly described as pre‑election analyses and polling released in June–August 2025; these pieces discuss the bill’s potential effects but precede November 4, 2025 ^{[1] [2] [3] [4]}. The reviewed summaries repeatedly note the absence of post‑election analysis: for example, one KFF summary dated June 17, 2025 analyzes views of the bill but does not report election aftermath or voter‑blame findings ^[1]. Another Center for American Progress analysis from June 12, 2025 projects cost increases but likewise contains no post‑Nov 4 polling indicating voter blame ^[2]. The provided dataset therefore lacks any source that is both post‑Nov 4 and that documents voters blaming the bill.

3. What the sources actually document about premium increases and who made those claims

The materials supplied consistently show that several organizations and analysts warned the bill would likely increase health costs for many Americans, identifying mechanisms such as subsidy expirations, changes to Medicare, and shifts in employer coverage that could push premiums higher ^{[2] [3] [6]}. Those are structured policy critiques and modeling results rather than voter sentiment data: they represent analysts, advocacy groups, and health‑policy reporters assessing how the bill would affect premiums if enacted. Pieces summarized in July and August 2025 likewise describe projected impacts and affordability concerns, but they stop short of presenting post‑election voter attribution linking premium changes to that bill ^{[3] [6]}.

4. Separate phenomenon: voter frustration about health costs exists, but attribution is murky in these materials

Some provided summaries note broader voter anger or concern about health care affordability in the run‑up to and in reporting around the 2025 election cycle, and they flag political ramifications for Republicans grappling with rising premiums as a campaign issue ^{[5] [7]}. However, the documents do not connect those expressions of frustration to a concrete finding that, after November 4, voters blamed the “Big Beautiful Bill” specifically for observed premium increases. In short, public concern about health costs is documented, but the supplied dataset does not include a post‑election poll or analysis showing voters explicitly assigning blame to that specific bill ^{[5] [7] [8]}.

5. Takeaway, caveats, and how to settle this definitively with additional evidence

Based on the supplied analyses, the claim that post‑Nov 4, 2025 election analyses show American voters blamed the “Big Beautiful Bill” for raising premiums is unsupported by the provided materials; the items instead contain pre‑election policy warnings about likely premium impacts ^{[1] [2] [3] [4]}. Important caveats: the dataset is limited to the listed summaries and explicitly omits any post‑Nov 4 polling or election‑night postmortems; such evidence may exist elsewhere. To settle this definitively, seek post‑Nov 4 voter surveys and contemporaneous news analyses that ask whether voters who experienced or observed premium rises attributed them to that specific bill; without that, the assertion remains unproven by the provided sources ^{[5] [8]}.