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What types of voting technology were used in the 2025 US election?
Executive summary
The preponderance of available reporting and federal policy indicates that the 2025 U.S. election relied overwhelmingly on paper-based and auditable voting systems, with the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) reinforcing paper records as the certification baseline. Major categories of equipment in active use included hand-marked paper ballots, optical-scan tabulators, ballot‑marking devices for accessibility, voter‑verified paper audit trails (VVPATs) paired with some electronic machines, and electronic poll books for check-in — while legacy direct‑recording electronic (DRE) machines persist in pockets. The balance of evidence shows continuity from 2024 into 2025: over 98 percent of jurisdictions already used systems that produce a paper record, the EAC issued a May 28, 2025 policy supporting paper-based standards, and state inventories list prevailing vendors and ballot-marking technologies [1] [2] [3].
1. Why paper dominated — a federal pivot that changed certification rules
Federal policy in 2025 formalized what election officials had already been doing: the EAC issued a May 28, 2025 policy and updated voluntary certification guidance that prioritize paper-based, auditable voting systems, citing verifiability and post‑election audits as core benefits. This policy aligns with statistics showing that nearly all voters live in jurisdictions that use systems with a paper record, a trend documented before 2025 and reinforced by the EAC’s certification and evaluation programs that now favor paper-ballot requirements for certification. The EAC also operates testing, certification, and field services programs that influence what systems jurisdictions buy and deploy, so the federal stance created stronger incentives for continued use of optical-scan and ballot‑marking solutions rather than pure touchscreen-only systems [4] [1] [2].
2. What the machines were — optical‑scan, ballot‑marking devices, VVPATs, and some DREs
The technology mix in 2025 reflected widespread use of optical-scan systems that count hand‑marked paper ballots and ballot‑marking devices (BMDs) that produce a paper ballot for voters with disabilities, plus VVPATs that provide a printed audit trail when used with certain electronic machines. Direct‑recording electronic machines still exist in a minority of jurisdictions, often paired with VVPAT printers so that a paper record can be audited. State inventories, such as New York’s descriptions of Clear Ballot, Dominion, ES&S and Hart systems, show these vendors’ products include both ballot marking and optical scan/tabulation components, and jurisdictions routinely deploy e‑poll books for check‑in and separate voter registration databases that do not directly interface with tabulation hardware [3] [5] [6].
3. How audits and accessibility shaped choices — tradeoffs and limits
Election officials prioritized systems that support post‑election audits and human‑verifiable records, which is why optical‑scan ballots and VVPAT-capable devices were emphasized. Audits require a durable paper trail, and the EAC guidance explicitly links paper records to auditability. At the same time, accessibility needs influenced procurement: ballot‑marking devices with audio and tactile interfaces enable voters with disabilities to cast privately verifiable paper ballots. However, important limitations remain: some VVPAT printers lack non‑visual verification for blind voters, and auditors’ effectiveness depends on jurisdictional practices and the extent to which manual audits are routinely conducted [2] [6].
4. Marketplace shifts and political narratives — Dominion’s sale and claims of reform
The voting‑systems marketplace saw headline changes in 2025, notably the sale of Dominion Voting Systems to a new owner rebranded as Liberty Vote; the new owner publicly promised a shift toward hand‑marked paper ballots while private communications suggested operational continuity. This development illustrates a broader dynamic: vendors respond both to regulatory pressure to provide paper‑backed systems and to political narratives about election security. Such corporate claims should be weighed against what jurisdictions actually deploy, which is constrained by certification timelines, inventories, and the EAC’s voluntary certification regime — meaning vendor promises do not instantly change the hardware used in every county [7] [4].
5. What remains uncertain and where to look next
Public reporting and EAC policy make it likely that 2025’s equipment mix continued the near‑universal use of paper‑based, auditable systems, but granular, jurisdiction‑by‑jurisdiction inventories determine precise machine counts and configurations. Official post‑election reports, state board inventories, county procurement records, and EAC certification lists provide the best, dated evidence for specific deployments. Reporters and researchers should compare procurement dates to the EAC certification timeline and examine post‑election audit reports to confirm which systems were actually used at scale in 2025, recognizing that vendor marketing and political claims sometimes overstate near‑term operational change [3] [4] [7].