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Fact check: Can the 20th Amendment or other constitutional provisions force funding if no appropriations signed?
Executive Summary
The Constitution does not provide a mechanism in the 20th Amendment to force federal spending when Congress fails to pass appropriations; instead, the Appropriations Clause requires that no money be drawn from the Treasury except by an act of Congress, leaving the power of the purse with legislators and limiting what the President can unilaterally obligate [1]. Political pressure—such as coordinated appeals from unions and stakeholders for a clean continuing resolution to reopen government and pay federal workers—can influence congressional action but cannot constitutionally compel spending without enacted law [2]. The practical contest over funding therefore rests on institutional checks, constitutional text, and political leverage rather than a judicially enforceable command embedded in the 20th Amendment [1] [2].
1. Why the 20th Amendment Doesn’t Unlock the Treasury: Historical and Textual Limits
The 20th Amendment addresses the timing of presidential and congressional terms and succession, not the mechanics of appropriations or compelled funding; it therefore cannot be read to authorize spending absent a law enacted by Congress. The Constitution’s Appropriations Clause is categorical: money may only be drawn from the Treasury pursuant to appropriations made by law, assigning discretion over expenditures to Congress and framing the President’s role as executing laws passed by that body. Historically, the Framers and subsequent jurisprudence treated Congress’s control of funds as a core check on executive power, rooted in British antecedents where parliamentary control of the purse constrained royal authority [1]. This textual and historical alignment means that the 20th Amendment does not transform lapses in appropriations into authority to spend.
2. Institutional Power: Congress’s Purse as a Political Weapon, Not an Automatic Fix
Congress’s power of the purse functions as a political, not a purely legal, lever: when appropriations lapse, the constitutional default is that spending stops unless lawmakers pass continuing resolutions or appropriations bills. The Appropriations Clause places legal constraints on drawing funds, but the resolution of funding gaps is predominantly a matter of legislative bargaining and political pressure, not judicial imposition of spending. Courts have been reluctant to rewrite the balance of powers by imposing funding obligations on Congress or the President; instead, remedies typically involve political remedies—negotiation, public pressure, and electoral consequences. This means that in practice, forcing funding without appropriations requires political action within Congress, not constitutional reinterpretation of the 20th Amendment or other clauses [1].
3. Political Pressure: The Role of Stakeholders Pressing for a Clean Continuing Resolution
Stakeholder coalitions—including unions like the American Federation of Government Employees and local trade groups—publicly call for a clean continuing resolution to reopen government and pay workers, framing shutdowns as harmful to essential services and livelihoods. These coalitions aim to translate public sympathy and organized pressure into legislative action, pushing members of Congress to pass temporary funding measures without controversial riders. While such mobilization increases the likelihood that Congress will act, it does not legally compel appropriations; the pressure is a tool of democratic accountability and bargaining leverage, not a constitutional mandate to spend [2]. The practical effect depends on lawmakers’ calculus, not a constitutional provision that overrides the Appropriations Clause.
4. Alternative Constitutional Provisions and Their Limits: What Courts and Scholars Say
Other constitutional provisions—such as the Take Care Clause or statutes tied to emergency powers—do not provide a clear legal pathway to spend federal money absent an appropriation, because the Appropriations Clause is explicit and foundational. Scholars and practitioners stress that while certain executive authorities allow actions in emergencies, they rarely bypass the requirement that funds be appropriated by law. Courts historically avoid interpreting broad constitutional provisions as authorizing expenditures that would contravene the explicit appropriations requirement, reinforcing the structural role of Congress’s funding authority. Thus, alternative constitutional arguments face steep textual and institutional constraints and would likely encounter judicial skepticism if posed as a way to mandate spending without enacted appropriations [1].
5. Bottom Line: Politics, Not the 20th Amendment, Decides Funding When Appropriations Lapse
When Congress fails to pass appropriations, the constitutional answer is not an automatic mandate to continue spending triggered by the 20th Amendment or similar provisions; instead, the Appropriations Clause anchors the rule that money leaves the Treasury only by law, and the resolution of funding gaps is governed by parliamentary process and political negotiation. Stakeholder campaigns for a clean continuing resolution illustrate how organized pressure shapes legislative outcomes, but they do not alter constitutional constraints—the power to compel funding resides with Congress through enacted appropriations. The most reliable routes to reopen funding remain political: passage of a continuing resolution, omnibus appropriations, or bipartisan compromise, not reinterpretation of the 20th Amendment [1] [2].