Keep Factually independent
Whether you agree or disagree with our analysis, these conversations matter for democracy. We don't take money from political groups - even a $5 donation helps us keep it that way.
Fact check: What are the historical precedents for invoking the 25th Amendment?
Executive Summary
The 25th Amendment, ratified in 1967, formalized procedures for presidential succession, filling vice presidential vacancies, and handling presidential disability; it has been used several times for short, voluntary transfers of power but Section 4 — the involuntary removal mechanism — has never been invoked [1] [2]. Historical practice before the amendment (including the deaths of Presidents William Henry Harrison and John F. Kennedy) exposed gaps that motivated the amendment’s adoption; recent political calls to use the 25th have highlighted procedural complexity and partisan dispute over its application [3] [1] [4].
1. Why the 25th Amendment Exists — A Crisis-Made Rulebook
The amendment was passed in response to succession uncertainties exposed by presidential assassinations and health crises, most notably the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and was ratified in 1967 to provide a clear constitutional mechanism for succession and disability [1]. Section 1 clarifies that the vice president becomes president upon the president’s death, resignation, or removal; Section 2 creates a procedure for filling a vacant vice-presidency; Sections 3 and 4 address temporary and contested transfers of power when a president cannot discharge duties [5]. This legal architecture aimed to replace ad hoc political judgments with written procedures to reduce ambiguity and maintain governmental continuity [6] [5].
2. The Amendment’s Practical Use — Short, Voluntary Transfers
Since ratification, the most common application of the 25th has been temporary, voluntary transfers under Section 3, where presidents have formally ceded power to their vice presidents during medical procedures. Notable examples include President Ronald Reagan’s handover to Vice President George H.W. Bush during surgery and President George W. Bush’s transfers ahead of colonoscopies [5] [2]. These uses established a practical precedent for low-conflict, procedural transfers that require a written declaration from the president to the leaders of Congress, demonstrating a conservative, continuity-focused application of the amendment rather than an instrument for political removal [5].
3. The Unused Constitutional Hammer — Section 4’s Never-Tested Power
Section 4 allows the vice president and a majority of the cabinet to declare a president incapable, with Congress resolving disputes, but it has never been invoked to forcibly remove a sitting president from power; scholars and practitioners note its complexity and potential for political turmoil [2]. The process requires written declarations, a 21-day congressional period, and a two-thirds vote in both houses to sustain removal; its untested status leaves unanswered questions about evidentiary standards, timeframes, and the role of non-cabinet actors in politically fraught scenarios [5] [2]. This legal blank spot fuels debate about feasibility and partisan weaponization.
4. Pre-Amendment History and Political Memory — Why 25th Mattered
Historical precedents cited in political discourse often reach beyond the amendment itself: the deaths of Presidents William Henry Harrison and John F. Kennedy exposed succession ambiguities and institutional vulnerability, helping persuade states and Congress to ratify the 25th [3] [1]. Those earlier crises showed how unclear norms could produce contested transitions and administrative instability, creating the political momentum for a written solution. The amendment therefore functions as both a legal fix and a historically informed guardrail intended to prevent ad hoc decision-making during national emergencies [3] [1].
5. Recent Political Calls and Procedural Realities — Who Can Invoke It?
Calls to invoke the 25th have surfaced in contemporary politics, including Governor J.B. Pritzker’s public suggestion in 2025 amid concerns about President Trump’s conduct; such calls illustrate how political actors often treat the amendment as a remedial tool for alleged incapacity, even while Section 4’s mechanism remains practically untested [4]. Importantly, procedural limits constrain who can act: the Speaker of the House cannot unilaterally invoke the amendment; instead, the vice president and a majority of the cabinet initiate Section 4, and Congress adjudicates contested cases [7]. These structural limits make political consensus essential for involuntary removal.
6. Competing Views and Institutional Agendas — Why Opinions Diverge
Analyses present competing assessments: some see the 25th as a necessary constitutional safety valve for protecting governance, while others warn of partisan exploitation or institutional overreach if Section 4 were used without broad consensus [2] [7]. Advocates emphasize continuity and legal clarity provided by Sections 1–3; critics highlight the unprecedented, fraught nature of invoking Section 4 and the risk that cabinet members or vice presidents could be pressured by partisan or personal agendas. This tension reflects divergent priorities between safeguarding the office and avoiding politically motivated removals [6] [7].
7. The Bottom Line — Precedent Is Limited but the Law Is Clearer Than Before
The historical record shows consistent, narrow use of the 25th for voluntary transfers and a substantive gap where involuntary removal would be required: Section 4 remains an untested constitutional mechanism, and past precedents prior to 1967 informed the amendment’s creation but do not substitute for its procedural text [5] [3]. Contemporary debates and public calls to use the amendment highlight political pressures but not new legal precedents; any future invocation would confront procedural hurdles, require cross-branch cooperation, and likely set lasting constitutional practice depending on how Congress and the courts respond [5] [7].