Section 4 of the 25th amendment invoked
Executive summary
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment — the constitutional mechanism that allows the vice president and a majority of the president’s principal officers (or another body Congress might create) to declare the president unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office — has never been invoked in American history, though it has been contemplated in several high‑profile moments and is the most contested and legally uncertain portion of the amendment [1] [2] [3].
1. What Section 4 says and how it would work in practice
Section 4 permits the vice president together with a majority of the Cabinet, or a body established by Congress, to transmit a written declaration to Congress that the president is unable to perform the office’s duties, immediately making the vice president the acting president; the president may later contest the declaration, triggering a complex process that can end in Congress deciding the issue [4] [5] [6].
2. The amendment’s intent, ambiguity and lack of judicial resolution
Drafters intended Section 4 to address situations where the president is incapacitated but cannot or will not declare inability, particularly physical or mental impairment, yet neither the statute nor subsequent Supreme Court precedent has fixed a clear threshold for “inability,” leaving scholars and courts to debate what facts would justify invocation [5] [7].
3. Historical near‑invocations that illuminate practical hurdles
Administrations have prepared to use Section 4 in crisis moments — most notably after President Reagan was shot in 1981, when staff drafted letters that would have invoked Section 4, and during later administrations where aides discussed it — but those preparations did not culminate in formal use, illustrating both the political sensitivity and procedural hesitancy around forcing a transfer of power [2] [8] [9].
4. The political dynamics that make invocation unlikely
Beyond legal ambiguity, the mechanism is inherently political: it requires the vice president’s willingness to lead and a majority of Cabinet secretaries (or an alternative body), a coalition that may be reluctant to be seen as removing an elected president absent overwhelming consensus; after the January 6 attack, calls by some lawmakers for Pence to invoke Section 4 met resistance and highlighted concerns about using a constitutional safety valve as a political remedy [10] [5] [3].
5. Congress’s potential role and the “other body” option
The text allows Congress to designate an alternative body to act with the vice president instead of Cabinet secretaries, and commentators and CRS analyses have suggested that Congress could craft a Disability Review Body by statute — but no such body has been created, which narrows the practical avenue for invocation to the cabinet plus vice president under current practice [4] [7].
6. Legal scholars’ split views and the policy tradeoffs
Some legal scholars and amendment framers argue Section 4 should be used in exceptionally dangerous situations to preserve continuity of government, while others warn of weaponizing a vague incapacity standard against political opponents; those competing perspectives reflect hidden agendas on both sides — a safety‑first impulse to avert catastrophe versus a protectionist instinct to shield elected presidents from politicized removal [5] [7].
7. Bottom line: has Section 4 ever been invoked?
No — Section 4 has never been formally invoked; Section 3 (voluntary transfer) has been used several times for medical procedures, and Section 2 has been used to fill vice‑presidential vacancies, but the involuntary, Cabinet‑led procedure of Section 4 remains unused in U.S. history [2] [3] [7].