What are the laws governing congressional pay during federal funding lapses (27th Amendment 1789 law)?

1. What the Constitution actually says — old text, modern consequences

The 27th Amendment, originally proposed in 1789 and finally ratified in 1992, makes a narrow rule: any change in compensation for Senators and Representatives cannot take effect until after the next election for Representatives, preventing immediate self-enrichment through pay increases. The Amendment’s language does not address temporary funding lapses or suspension of pay during a lapse; it only governs when enacted pay changes become operative. Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution, which provides for congressional compensation, further complicates efforts to withhold pay because it plainly contemplates that members shall be paid. Legal commentators and lawmakers draw on these distinct texts when arguing whether withholding pay during a shutdown would be constitutional, with some contemporaneous summaries noting the Amendment’s limited scope and the consequent legal uncertainty about pay suspensions ^{[6] [7] [2]}.

2. The statutory and administrative backdrop — Antideficiency Act and federal payrolls

The Antideficiency Act governs agency conduct during appropriations lapses by restricting obligations and expenditures absent appropriations, but it primarily targets executive-branch spending and has detailed exceptions for excepted activities. It does not expressly dictate whether congressional salaries, which are paid under statutory appropriations and constitutional provision, must cease during a lapse. Agency guidance and FAQs on operations during funding lapses explain who continues to work and under what funds, yet these sources do not treat congressional pay as subject to the same automatic suspension rules applicable to many federal employees. That regulatory silence is why legislators and advocates keep debating whether statutory or constitutional fixes are needed to make lawmakers forgo pay during shutdowns ^{[8] [9]}.

3. Recent 2025 proposals and maneuvers — who’s pushing what, and who objected

In November 2025 several lawmakers introduced bills and amendment proposals aimed at withholding congressional pay during shutdowns. Senator John Kennedy put forward the No Shutdown Paychecks to Politicians Act and the Withhold Member Pay During Shutdowns Act; Senator Lindsey Graham proposed an amendment to redirect withheld salaries to the Treasury; House proposals with express “No Budget, No Pay” language surfaced as well. These efforts encountered procedural and political resistance—Senators Rand Paul and Patty Murray blocked at least one Kennedy maneuver—highlighting that political bargaining, not just constitutional text, shapes whether pay-withholding becomes law. Press statements and contemporaneous reporting show a split between symbolic gestures (some members voluntarily forgo pay) and formal legal change attempts that face constitutional and practical hurdles ^{[1] [3] [4] [5]}.

4. Constitutional and practical objections — why critics say “no”

Constitutional objections emphasize the 27th Amendment’s limitation on altering compensation timing and Article I’s guarantee of pay; critics argue that forcibly withholding pay during a lapse could run afoul of compensation guarantees or require an amendment. Practical objections stress unequal impacts: withheld pay would disproportionately affect first-term or lower-wealth members and could undermine representational diversity if service becomes less tenable for non-wealthy candidates. Legal scholars and some lawmakers therefore argue that symbolic withholding may be politically attractive but legally risky and socially regressive, raising separation-of-powers and fairness concerns. These objections are reflected in contemporary legal summaries and legislative analyses produced during the 2025 funding debates ^{[2] [3]}.

5. The path forward — politics, amendments, and likelihood of change

Fixing this gap would take either clear statutory redesign or a constitutional amendment. A successful amendment would require two-thirds majorities in both chambers and ratification by 75% of states, a high bar noted by proponents who nevertheless proposed amendments in 2025 to bar pay during shutdowns. Legislatively, Congress could craft a statute conditioned on appropriations that survives constitutional scrutiny, but that still invites litigation given the 27th Amendment’s text and Article I’s compensation clause. The immediate near-term landscape favors political compromises and voluntary actions rather than definitive legal resolution, with media and lawmakers continuing to debate proportionality, enforceability, and electoral consequences as the 2025 shuttering episodes unfolded ^{[3] [5] [1]}.