How did the Abraham Accords affect Israeli settlement policies and settler violence between 2020 and 2024?
Executive summary
The Abraham Accords reshaped regional diplomacy but did not restrain Israeli settlement expansion or settler violence between 2020 and 2024; if anything, normalization coincided with continued and in some years accelerated settlement approvals and a sharp rise in settler attacks documented by U.N., Western press and advocacy groups [1] [2] [3]. Debates among analysts trace this outcome to a decoupling of Arab–Israeli normalization from the Israeli‑Palestinian track and to Washington’s limited leverage after 2020, producing divergent incentives for Israeli policymakers and for Gulf partners focused on security and commercial ties [4] [5].
1. The formal bargain: normalization without a Palestinian price‑tag
The Abraham Accords formalized diplomatic, economic and security ties between Israel and several Arab states beginning in 2020, prioritizing technology, trade and counter‑Iran cooperation over a renewed Israeli‑Palestinian settlement process [5] [4]. That transactional framing meant Arab signatories and potential partners often sought tangible economic and security benefits rather than insisting on Israeli freezes to settlement growth, which undercut a classical Arab leverage mechanism linking normalization to progress for Palestinians [4] [6].
2. Settlement policy continued, edged toward legalization and expansion
From 2020 through 2024 the Israeli government and its agencies continued to advance settlement construction, approve new settlements and take administrative steps that facilitated expansion — including decisions in 2024 to recognize dozens of outposts and approve thousands of housing units in Area C and East Jerusalem as reported to the U.N. and in press coverage [1] [2] [7]. European reporting and EU analysis show 2024 policy shifts that institutionalized previously irregular practices — a “bypass legalization mechanism” and large declarations of state land — demonstrating formal state facilitation of what had once been more ad hoc outpost growth [8].
3. Settler violence rose and accountability faltered
Multiple sources documented a marked increase in violence by settlers against Palestinians across the West Bank after 2020, with U.N. officials and journalistic investigations reporting sharper spikes in attacks, property destruction and expulsions and chronic failures to hold perpetrators accountable [1] [8] [3]. Advocacy groups and the U.N. reported closures of investigations without indictments and a climate of impunity linked to both settler actions and, at times, military deployment patterns that facilitated expansion and hardened control over contested areas [8] [1].
4. Why normalization did not check settlements — incentives and geopolitical cover
Analysts point to several mechanisms: Gulf and other signatories prioritized the strategic and economic dividends of normalization, offering Israel political cover and market access while failing to make settlement restraint a central enforcement condition [4] [9]. U.S. policy shifts between administrations and limited consistent pressure after 2020 also reduced external constraints; warnings by U.S. officials in 2023 about settlement activity harming prospects for further normalization signaled concern but did not stop approvals on the ground [5] [9].
5. Alternative readings and contested causal lines
Some defenders argue the Accords anchored regional security ties that could, in the long run, create conditions for de‑escalation and incentives to manage violence, emphasizing increased coordination and economic interdependence [9] [6]. Critics counter that normalization effectively decoupled Arab states from Palestinian leverage, emboldening Israeli right‑wing actors to push annexationist agendas and expedite settlement legalization — an interpretation echoed by investigative commentators and human‑rights oriented reporting [10] [3] [8]. Reporting shows both dynamics coexisted: expanded trade and security links alongside stepped‑up settlement moves and heightened settler violence [6] [1].
Conclusion: normalization changed regional calculations but not on‑the‑ground settlement realities
Between 2020 and 2024 the Abraham Accords shifted the regional diplomatic map and created new economic and security alignments, yet they did not produce Israeli restraint on settlements or a meaningful drop in settler violence; official facilitation, legal changes and weak accountability mechanisms carried expansion and attacks forward even as some external actors warned of political costs to normalization [4] [8] [1]. Where the evidence ends: direct causation remains debated among scholars and policymakers, but the contemporaneous record shows normalization was compatible with — and did not prevent — intensified settlement policies and settler violence in this period [10] [3] [2].