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Fact check: Which countries have normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords?
Executive summary
The Abraham Accords began in 2020 with formal normalization between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and were later associated with normalization steps involving Sudan and Morocco; the United States played a central mediating role in those agreements [1]. Over time analysis has framed the accords as both a diplomatic breakthrough expanding Israel’s regional ties and a politically contested project that left the Palestinian question unresolved, producing divergent assessments about their scope and durability [2] [3] [4]. Below I extract the key claims in the materials provided, compare perspectives, and note what is emphasized or omitted.
1. How the Accords began — an unexpected diplomatic pivot that made headlines
The immediate claim across the sources is that the Abraham Accords were announced and signed in September 2020, with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain agreeing to establish formal diplomatic relations with Israel in Washington, D.C., under U.S. mediation [1] [5]. Reporting from 2020 framed those signings as historic because they marked the first Arab recognitions of Israel since Jordan’s 1994 treaty, and they were presented by advocates as a strategic and economic opening for the region [6] [3]. The sources agree the U.S. government under President Trump was the central broker in those initial agreements [1].
2. Which countries are named as signatories or normalization partners
The materials repeatedly list the UAE and Bahrain as the initial Abraham Accords partners and then expand the roster to include Sudan and Morocco, which took steps toward normalization in the months after the 2020 announcements [1] [6]. Contemporary overviews and retrospectives treat Egypt and Jordan as earlier, separate normalization cases from 1979 and 1994 respectively, not part of the 2020 Accords, but they are commonly cited for historical context about Arab–Israeli normalization [6]. The texts emphasize that Sudan and Morocco’s inclusion followed distinct bilateral tracks influenced by U.S. diplomatic activity and country-specific concessions [1] [7].
3. What proponents say — diplomacy, economics, and strategic realignment
Supportive analyses argue the accords represent a diplomatic and economic leap for Israel and its new partners, facilitating trade, tourism, and security cooperation, and recalibrating regional alliances against shared threats [2] [4]. Proponents highlight increased commercial ties and official exchanges as measurable outputs, and frame the accords as proof that Arab states will pursue normalization independently of Palestinian-Israeli final-status progress [2] [7]. The sources present this viewpoint as a central rationale for the accords’ architects and participating governments [2].
4. What critics and cautious observers highlight — the Palestinian issue and durability
Cautionary accounts underscore that the accords did not resolve the Palestinian question, which remains a core source of regional tension and a major omission from the agreements’ agenda [3] [7]. Critics point out that normalization proceeded in bilateral formats that often sidelined Palestinian leadership and public sentiment, raising questions about long-term domestic political durability for signatory governments and the moral-political trade-offs they accepted [3]. The sources show this critique as a persistent caveat in both initial reporting and later assessments [3] [4].
5. U.S. mediation and the incentives on offer — carrots, credits, and divergent bargains
The materials document the U.S. role as a decisive factor: Washington facilitated signings and, in certain cases, coupled normalization with incentives like diplomatic recognition, financial or policy concessions, and bilateral promises tailored to each partner [1]. The sources indicate that Sudan and Morocco’s moves were tied to specific U.S. actions and incentives, illustrating that the Abraham Accords functioned as a diplomatic package that varied by country rather than a uniform multilateral treaty [1] [5]. This heterogeneity explains divergent domestic reactions and legal-political outcomes in each state.
6. How observers judge the accords’ resilience through crises
Later analyses from 2025 assess the Accords’ resilience amid regional shocks like the Gaza war, noting that despite severe political strains the agreements largely remained intact among signatory governments, though the depth of cooperation fluctuated [4]. Commentators emphasize that strategic and economic ties created by the accords have inertia, but they also record episodic diplomatic distance and public backlash in signatory states when Israeli-Palestinian violence escalates [4] [2]. These sources paint a picture of conditional durability rather than irreversible integration.
7. Gaps, ambiguities, and what the provided sources omit
The supplied materials consistently list UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco as Abraham Accords participants but do not provide exhaustive legal texts, dates for Sudan and Morocco’s steps, or a comprehensive accounting of follow-up agreements and domestic reactions [6] [1]. They emphasize strategic benefits and U.S. mediation while offering limited empirical metrics on trade volumes, security arrangements, or public opinion trends across signatory populations [2] [7]. For a fuller picture, readers should consult primary treaty texts, government communiqués, and contemporaneous reporting from each capital.