Fact check: What would be required for a constitutional amendment to allow a president to serve more than two terms?

1. Why the 22nd Amendment Is the Gatekeeper — and What It Says Loudly

The 22nd Amendment, ratified in 1951, unequivocally bars any person from being elected president more than twice, a response to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s four terms and an institutional choice to enshrine turnover in the executive branch. Any proposal to let a president serve a third elected term must confront this explicit constitutional text; changing that text is not an interpretive question but a formal amendment task. The Amendment’s language has also prompted scholarly and media scrutiny over edge cases — for example, whether a twice-elected former president could serve temporarily as vice president or acting president — but those debates do not negate the Amendment’s clear bar on being elected again ^{[1] [3]}.

2. The Two Routes to Change — Congress or a Convention of States

There are two constitutionally prescribed paths to amend the 22nd Amendment. The first, and historically dominant, path requires a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate to propose an amendment, followed by ratification from three-fourths of state legislatures or state ratifying conventions. The alternative, less-used mechanism is a national convention called by two-thirds of state legislatures, which could propose amendments that must then be ratified by three-fourths of the states. Both routes demand broad, cross-regional coalitions and sustained political capital; neither is a simple legislative tweak and both have precedents and procedural complexities that make rapid change difficult ^{[2] [4]}.

3. Recent Political Reality — Proposals Versus Practicality

In the current political moment, there are proposals in Congress that would alter term limits, such as a House resolution introduced to permit up to three presidential terms, but proposals alone do not change the Constitution and face a steep climb. Congressional leaders and analysts publicly doubt a feasible pathway for such an amendment, noting the lack of the necessary two-thirds congressional consensus and the improbability of securing ratification by three-fourths of state legislatures. Political leaders have pointed to international examples where leaders have extended or abolished term limits, but those cases underscore contrasts with the U.S. constitutional framework rather than provide a straightforward model for change ^{[5] [6]}.

4. Institutional and Scholarly Perspectives on Reform Feasibility

Legal scholars and constitutional institutions have analyzed Article V to assess whether reform is possible and how process design can affect outcomes. Projects led by constitutional centers bring forward historical context, procedural hurdles, and recommended reforms for the amendment process, emphasizing that technical pathway planning is necessary but not sufficient; political consensus is the binding constraint. Scholarship highlights that while the amendment process is deliberately hard to prevent capricious alteration of foundational rules, its complexity means any successful change would reflect deep, bipartisan or widespread state-level agreement ^[7].

5. State-Level and Comparative Considerations That Shape Ratification Chances

Ratification by three-fourths of states is the decisive stage. State legislatures vary widely in political composition and constitutional culture; some states require supermajorities for state-level changes, and state leaders may be responsive to national partisan dynamics. Comparative examples — such as countries that have abolished term limits — illustrate that political systems and legal traditions matter: what is feasible in one country is not automatically transferable to the U.S. federal constitutional structure. Analysts note that state-level politics and the national partisan environment together make achieving the required number of ratifying states a formidable obstacle ^{[8] [6]}.

6. Beyond Mechanics: Democratic Stakes and Potential Backlash

Changing the two-term limit carries consequences beyond legal mechanics: it would alter a constitutional norm aimed at preventing prolonged incumbency and preserving democratic rotation. Political opponents and many civic groups would likely mobilize against changes perceived as empowering incumbents, while proponents argue for voter choice and flexibility. The amendment process’ high thresholds mean that any successful change would reflect a national shift in consensus; conversely, failure would likely reaffirm the existing two-term norm. The debate therefore combines procedural difficulty with deep normative questions about democratic stability, accountability, and what the public perceives as legitimate executive tenure ^{[4] [9]}.