In recent years, American federalism has become more decentralised.
Executive summary
The short answer: American federalism in recent years is neither simply more decentralized nor uniformly more centralized; it has become more transactional and issue-specific, producing pockets of devolution alongside new forms of national concentration of power [1] [2]. Scholarly reviews show administrations and courts shifting responsibilities in ways that sometimes offload federal programs to states while other institutional trends—judicialization and the administrative presidency—concentrate power at the national level [1] [2].
1. Presidential tactics that read like decentralization but often reconfigure authority
Presidential budgets and “revitalizing federalism” rhetoric have translated in some instances into the explicit offloading of federal programs—eliminating certain FEMA grants, EPA loan lines, and federal rental assistance—thereby shifting programmatic responsibility to states and localities [1]. Yet this administrative shift comes from an expanded administrative presidency that uses executive orders, rulemaking, appointments, and reorganizations to set national policy and shape intergovernmental relations, meaning decentralizing gestures can be tied to stronger presidential control over the levers that enable or constrain states [1].
2. Courts as centralizers even while they send policy outcomes to states
The recent “judicialization” of gridlocked politics has empowered federal courts to become decisive arbiters of the federal–state balance; in many controversies courts have ruled in ways that devolve substantive authority to states, but the very centrality of courts as referees concentrates constitutional power at the national judicial level and makes the outcome contingent on a centralized legal process [2]. Thus devolution of policy authority often occurs through a centralized institution—federal courts—rather than through diffuse local governance alone [2].
3. Polarization, punitive federalism, and the pandemic: decentralization as partisan strategy
Pandemic-era responses illustrated a split pattern: some governors praised decentralization for speed and local responsiveness, while others criticized federal inaction and sought more national coordination, and scholars coined “punitive federalism” to describe federal threats or sanctions when states diverge from national policy preferences [3]. Political polarization has turned states into laboratories and proxies for national battles, which can look like decentralization when states act independently but is driven by national partisan conflict rather than a neutral transfer of authority [4] [3].
4. Long-term structural forces pushing both toward and away from decentralization
Historians and institutional scholars emphasize episodic swings—from New Deal centralization to Reagan-era devolution—but warn that contemporary dynamics (nationalization of politics, declining local attachments, and the self-reinforcing mechanics of central institutions) have strengthened forces that centralize authority even as discrete programs are devolved [5] [6]. Academic treatments highlight how decentralization can inject diffusion and inequality into governance, meaning that more local authority is not uniformly synonymous with healthier federalism [7] [8].
5. Public preferences and democratic consequences complicate the headline
Public opinion research shows Americans’ preferences for local versus national authority are uneven and often partisan: some citizens prefer local control for policy areas aligned with their ideology while others favor national solutions, so apparent decentralization can reflect venue-shopping and unequal accountability rather than a stable shift in institutional power [9]. Scholars warn that decentralization generates inequalities in voice, oversight, and information—mechanisms that can deepen political inequality even as they expand state discretion [8] [9].
Conclusion: a conditional verdict—decentralized in detail, centralized in mechanism
The evidence in recent reporting and scholarship supports a qualified conclusion: policy authority has been devolved in specific programs and political contexts, but institutional trends—expanded administrative tools, a more interventionist judiciary, and nationalized partisan conflict—have simultaneously concentrated decision-making power at national nodes or made state power dependent on centralized actors [1] [2] [3]. The net effect is a more transactional, contested federalism where decentralization is selective and often produced through centralized mechanisms rather than through a simple shift of sovereignty to states [1] [5].