Who has the authority to call up the national guard on January 6th?
This fact-check may be outdated. Consider refreshing it to get the most current information.
Executive summary
Authority to call up the National Guard on January 6, 2021, was legally and practically split among multiple actors: the District of Columbia Mayor could request DC National Guard assistance, the Capitol Police Board could request Guard support for the Capitol, the President/Secretary of Defense held ultimate command authority over the DC Guard (delegated to the Secretary of the Army), and the Acting Secretary of Defense approved mobilization that afternoon (e.g., Christopher Miller authorized activation around 3:04–4:32 p.m.), with actual deployment orders and timing disputed in official accounts [1] [2] [3] [4]. Major General William Walker, commanding the DC National Guard, lacked the unfettered immediate response authority he normally possessed because of written restrictions placed days earlier [5] [6] [2].
1. Who legally controls the DC Guard: a tangled chain of command
The District of Columbia National Guard occupies a unique position: the President has direct command authority when the Guard is federalized, but for operations in the District the President’s authority has been delegated down—to the Secretary of Defense and onward to the Secretary of the Army—so Pentagon leadership effectively controlled operational decisions about DC Guard deployment on Jan. 6 [7] [2]. Contemporary accounts and committee reports stress that while local officials could request support, top-level DoD authorization was required for significant deployments affecting the Capitol [1] [4].
2. Local requests: Mayor Bowser and the Capitol Police Board
Mayor Muriel Bowser did formally request Guard assistance for Jan. 5–6 to help with Metro stations and traffic control; the mayor’s letters limited the request to specific crowd-management roles and did not give her the unilateral authority to deploy Guard troops to the Capitol itself [1]. Separately, the Capitol Police Board (the Architect of the Capitol plus the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms) holds the authority to request National Guard support for the Capitol, and testimony shows Capitol Police Chief Steven Sund lobbied the Board repeatedly on Jan. 6 to authorize Guard deployment [5] [2].
3. The role of the Acting Secretary of Defense and the timing dispute
On Jan. 6, Acting Secretary Christopher Miller is the official who ultimately approved mobilization and activation of DC National Guard elements; different timelines in official reports place his decisions and approvals from mid-afternoon through early evening, with the first Guard contingent arriving after authorization was communicated [4] [8] [6]. House and Senate committee findings and DoD timelines differ over the precise moments of approval and notification — the Pentagon inspector general and other inquiries record authorizations communicated at 4:35 p.m. or later, while Guard commanders reported later times for when they received orders [9] [4].
4. Why commanders said they were constrained
Weeks before the riot, Defense and Army leaders issued memos that constrained Maj. Gen. William Walker’s ability to respond without prior approval; those restrictions meant the DC Guard commander could not exercise his normal immediate-response authority to protect federal property or life without higher-level sign-off [5] [6] [2]. Walker and others told investigators that those constraints, and confusion about who could authorize what, contributed to delays in getting troops to the Capitol [4] [10].
5. Conflicting narratives and unresolved questions
Multiple official reports and news outlets concur that President Trump had the legal authority but “never gave any order to deploy the National Guard on January 6,” while also noting he participated in discussions before the event; committee findings emphasize that conflicting messages, written restrictions and delays in authorization—not a single identifiable refusal—explain the later arrival of Guard forces [3] [9] [11]. Republicans and some DoD officials have offered alternative characterizations of who authorized or hindered movement; congressional probes and inspector-general reviews continue to present partly competing timelines and interpretations [7] [4].
6. Bottom line for the question “Who has the authority?”
Available sources show authority was not vested in a single person: the Capitol Police Board could request Guard support for the Capitol; Mayor Bowser could request limited DC Guard assistance for the District; and the Secretary of Defense (acting through delegated authority to the Secretary of the Army and Pentagon leadership) was the pivotal official who approved broader mobilization and deployment of the DC National Guard on Jan. 6 [2] [1] [7]. Sources do not present a clean, uncontested narrative of exactly who spoke when and why delays happened; congressional reports, DoD timelines, and Guard testimony record overlapping, sometimes contradictory accounts that leave key timing and decision-making questions partly unresolved [4] [9].
Limitations: This account synthesizes only the supplied reporting and official summaries; available sources do not mention every private phone call or internal message and therefore cannot definitively resolve every timing discrepancy or motive behind individual decisions [4] [9].