What efforts has the Biden administration made to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since 2021?
Executive summary
Since 2021 the Biden administration has pursued a restrained, incremental strategy to revive Israeli‑Palestinian peacemaking: emphasizing regional normalization as the primary lever, restoring limited Palestinian-facing diplomacy and assistance, and investing modestly in people‑to‑people and economic programs rather than relaunching high‑stakes, direct Israeli‑Palestinian negotiations [1] [2] [3]. Critics say that incrementalism amounted to deprioritization and failed to alter the structural drivers of the conflict, while supporters argue it was a pragmatic effort to build leverage — particularly around a possible Saudi‑Israel deal — that could reopen political horizons for Palestinians [4] [5] [6].
1. Normalization-first diplomacy: betting on Arab‑Israel ties to change the calculus
From early in the term the administration publicly embraced and sought to expand the Abraham Accords and related Arab‑Israel normalization as the pathway to creating regional incentives for Israeli concessions to Palestinians, with U.S. diplomacy focused on nudging Saudi and other Gulf ties with Israel as a potential lever for Palestinian gains [1] [5] [6].
2. Grand‑bargain ambitions: tying Saudi normalization to Palestinian steps
Behind the scenes Washington explored a high‑risk “grand bargain” that would link a Saudi‑Israel normalization pact to concrete, irreversible steps toward Palestinian statehood — a diplomatic gamble repeatedly reported by analysts and former officials as the centerpiece of White House strategy to break the deadlock [6].
3. Restoring Palestinian ties and modest institutional moves
The administration restored parts of U.S. engagement cut under the prior administration: it resumed funding to UNRWA, reopened a U.S. mission to Palestinian affairs in Jerusalem (as the U.S. Office on Palestinian Affairs rather than a full consulate), and signaled renewed outreach to the Palestinian Authority while stopping short of reversing all Trump-era moves such as relocating the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem [7] [3].
4. Quiet tools: aid, MEPPA, and “gradualism” as peacebuilding
Rather than pushing an immediate political track, Washington invested in targeted economic and civil‑society programming, notably the Middle East Partnership for Peace Act (MEPPA) and related funds earmarked for Israeli‑Palestinian cooperation — a $250 million multi‑year package in U.S. development and finance vehicles meant to rebuild contacts and capacity [2]. Prominent think‑tanks and administration advisers framed this as “gradualism”: building trust and incentives slowly while normalization with Arab states creates space for political progress [5] [2].
5. Limited presidential engagement and public messaging on two states
President Biden and senior officials repeatedly affirmed U.S. support for a two‑state outcome and publicly acknowledged Palestinian grievances, but also declared that “the ground is not ripe” for direct negotiations — a posture that signaled rhetorical support without committing the political capital to drive talks, drawing criticism from Arab and Palestinian leaders [8] [3] [4].
6. Constraints, criticism and conditional tools of influence
The administration’s approach attracted sharp critiques: Arab and Palestinian voices said deprioritization allowed the status quo to ossify and that U.S. moves favored normalization over Palestinian rights [4] [7]. Analysts warned the strategy depended on Israeli and Palestinian willingness and on high‑stakes Saudi calculations, making success unlikely without stronger U.S. ownership [9] [6]. U.S. conditionality also surfaced in operational form — for example, questions inside the U.S. government about Israeli compliance with legal standards complicated operational intelligence sharing during wartime, underscoring limits to Washington’s unconditional leverage [10].
Conclusion: an incremental, risk‑heavy strategy with mixed results
The Biden administration threaded a narrow path: restoring some Palestinian relations and aid, betting on Arab‑Israel normalization as leverage, funding peacebuilding programs, and publicly supporting two states while declining to force a direct negotiation push; this produced modest institutional restoration and ambitious back‑channel planning (notably toward Saudi normalization) but left many critics unconvinced that the approach changed the conflict’s core dynamics [2] [6] [4]. Reporting does not establish that the administration ever mounted a sustained, high‑intensity U.S. mediation campaign comparable to past presidential peacemaking — instead it favored calibrated incentives and regional deals whose success remained contingent on external actors and political will on both Israeli and Palestinian sides [5] [9].