What changes to drone and lethal-authority policies did the Biden administration make after Obama?

1. Reinstating a higher civilian-protection threshold

One of the clearest changes was the restoration of a “near certainty” standard—an operational requirement that commanders be nearly certain strikes will not harm civilians—a metric that had been loosened under the Trump administration and was publicly described as reinstated by the Biden review ^{[2] [1]}; civil liberties groups and some analysts welcomed the return toward Obama-era safeguards even as they argued the steps did not go far enough ^{[4] [3]}.

2. Recentralizing lethal-authority in the presidency

Biden’s rules generally require that the president personally approve lethal strikes or commando raids against specific counterterrorism targets outside conventional war zones, effectively recentralizing authority that the Trump administration had pushed down the chain of command; the policy does allow the president to waive requirements in particular cases, a concession that keeps discretion for the executive intact ^{[1] [5]}.

3. New procedural signoffs and diplomatic checks

The declassified portions of the new guidance show added bureaucratic signoffs: operators are expected to get permission from the State Department’s chief of mission in the country concerned, and the guidance directs more emphasis on capture and partner-building rather than defaulting to strikes—measures intended to tighten interagency review and reduce misidentification risks ^{[1] [6]}.

4. Classified policy, partial declassification, and transparency fights

Much of the Biden guidance was issued in a classified memorandum and only made partially public after litigation by the ACLU and the New York Times; civil liberties advocates say the release clarified some limits but criticized the secrecy and argued that the policy still entrenches broad unilateral presidential power rather than subjecting lethal force to congressional authorization or meaningful public debate ^{[4] [3] [7]}.

5. Operational reality: fewer strikes than past peaks, but not an end to drone warfare

Analysts tracking strike reporting found U.S. drone and counterterrorism strikes under Biden remained well below their historical peaks, and some theaters (like Pakistan) had long pauses predating his term, but strikes continued in places such as Somalia with variable tempo—illustrating that tighter rules did not equate to a categorical halt of remote lethal operations ^{[8] [9]}.

6. Export policy and proliferation tensions

On a separate track, the administration signaled an inclination to keep a Trump-era reinterpretation of export rules that expanded armed drone sales by revising Missile Technology Control Regime practice—moves that angered arms-control advocates and some Democrats because they risked spreading lethal drone capabilities to actors with problematic human-rights records ^[10].

7. Critics’ case: policy improvements, but limited structural reform

Critics—including legal scholars and civil-rights groups—argue Biden’s changes are procedural tightening rather than structural reform: the policy remains a presidential memorandum rather than statute, grants continuing executive flexibilities (waivers and classified authorities), and leaves unresolved core legal debates the Obama administration had already pushed ^{[7] [11] [5]}.

Conclusion: a cautious tightening with durable executive discretion

The net effect is a return to stronger procedural guardrails reminiscent of Obama-era standards—higher civilian-protection thresholds, presidential sign-off, and diplomatic checks—paired with continued executive-centered decision making, limited transparency until litigation forced disclosure, and a decision to keep (or at least review keeping) Trump-era export deregulatory moves that could broaden global proliferation ^{[2] [1] [10] [3]}.