Has Biden sought Congressional approval for military actions in 2024?
Executive summary
President Biden did not seek a new, standalone congressional authorization for the military actions carried out in 2024; instead, his administration relied on a mixture of prior Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMFs), Article II constitutional powers, and War Powers Resolution reports to Congress [1] [2]. Critics in Congress and outside groups say the administration has expanded executive war powers without formal congressional approval, while the White House has submitted multiple 48‑hour and six‑month reports under the War Powers Resolution to notify Congress of strikes and deployments [3] [1] [2].
1. What Biden actually did: notification, not fresh authorization
The White House repeatedly notified Congress under the War Powers Resolution that U.S. forces conducted “discrete strikes” and other actions in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere in early 2024, submitting four 48‑hour reports and a consolidated six‑month War Powers report rather than seeking a new statutory authorization for those operations [2] [1]. Those letters describe strikes in late December 2023 and in January–February 2024 against IRGC‑linked facilities and Houthi targets and frame the actions as justified by the President’s constitutional authorities and existing AUMFs [1] [4].
2. Legal basis cited by the administration
The administration has cited Article II powers (the President’s commander‑in‑chief authority) and existing AUMFs — notably the 2001 and 2002 authorizations — as part of its legal rationale for limited strikes and counter‑Houthi operations instead of asking Congress for a distinct 2024 authorization [2] [5]. Lawfare and CRS analyses note the White House’s reporting trend blends Article II claims with references to those older authorizations when describing limited uses of force [5] [2].
3. Critics: ‘no congressional blessing’ for expanding engagements
Observers including the International Crisis Group and congressional progressives argue that the U.S. became involved in “mini‑conflicts” in the Middle East in 2024 “without the White House seeking approval from Congress” and that this pattern expands presidential war powers beyond intended checks [6]. Progressives in the House explicitly accused the administration of deploying personnel and engaging in operations without congressional authorization and demanded explanations [7] [8].
4. Administration’s procedural posture and accountability moves
Rather than seeking a fresh vote to authorize force, the administration used War Powers Resolution notifications (48‑hour reports and the six‑month consolidated report) as its primary congressional communication vehicle and has said those reports are part of keeping Congress “fully informed” while relying on prior legal authorities for action [4] [1]. Analysts and legal scholars observe that the WPR reports afford transparency but do not substitute for affirmative congressional authorization when the scale or duration of hostilities grows [2] [3].
5. Congress did pass broad military funding and policy measures in 2024, but not an AUMF
Congress acted on defense budgets and the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act — an $886 billion defense policy bill and related appropriations — which authorize spending and policy but do not equate to a statutory authorization to use force in new hostilities; those are separate constitutional authorities centered on AUMFs or explicit congressional votes to authorize the use of force [9] [10]. Congress and the White House also discussed supplemental funding for allies (Ukraine, Israel) but funding votes are distinct from war‑powers authorizations [11] [12].
6. Competing viewpoints and political constraints
Supporters of the administration’s approach say limited, time‑bounded strikes and the use of existing authorizations preserve necessary flexibility to protect U.S. forces and interests; opponents argue this practice circumvents the constitutional role of Congress and risks mission creep. Some Senate Democrats privately share concerns but have been reluctant to publicly confront the president given political calculations [3] [13].
7. What the sources do not say
Available sources do not mention any instance in 2024 where the Biden White House formally requested and received a new, standalone congressional Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) specifically authorizing the strikes and deployments reported that year; reporting instead records War Powers notifications and reliance on older legal authorities (not found in current reporting; see [1]; p2_s8).
8. Why this matters going forward
The practice of relying on Article II and older AUMFs while informing Congress under the War Powers Resolution shapes the institutional balance between the presidency and Congress and has prompted legislative proposals to reinvigorate congressional oversight of war powers; advocates for reform want a clearer, bipartisan statutory framework to avoid repeated reliance on dated authorities [14] [2].