Were any Biden-era strikes conducted without congressional approval or congressional notification?

1. What happened: strikes notified but not pre‑authorized

In January 2024 the White House ordered retaliatory strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen and informed Congress of the action rather than requesting prior authorization; Reuters and Politico report the administration “informed Congress of the impending strikes, but did not seek its approval” and that Democrats criticized the lack of congressional authorization ^{[1] [2]}. Earlier, Biden ordered February 2021 strikes in Syria likewise without asking Congress to vote in advance; lawmakers publicly demanded the administration explain its legal basis afterward ^[3].

2. How the administration explains its legal authority

The White House and some legal analysts point to the president’s Article II commander‑in‑chief powers, to the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for Use of Military Force (AUMFs), and to the right of self‑defense in response to attacks on U.S. interests as the legal grounds for acting without a fresh congressional authorization ^{[4] [5] [6]}. The Congressional Research Service notes the administration has sometimes pivoted from reliance on Article II alone to invoking earlier AUMFs in its reporting to Congress ^[6].

3. Congressional and partisan pushback

Progressive Democrats and some Republicans publicly criticized the administration for not obtaining congressional approval, arguing Article I vests Congress with the power to authorize uses of force and that offensive actions “without congressional approval” raise constitutional concerns ^{[2] [1]}. Lawmakers including Rep. Ro Khanna and others said they were not briefed in advance despite planning and international coordination, and many demanded votes or clearer legal justification ^{[4] [7]}.

4. Legal debate: precedent and limits

Commentators note precedent for presidents of both parties ordering strikes without congressional votes — examples cited include Biden’s Syria strike, Trump’s killing of Qassem Soleimani, Obama’s Libya bombing, and Clinton’s Kosovo campaign — which feeds the argument that presidents routinely act unilaterally on limited strikes ^{[8] [9]}. Other legal scholars emphasize limits: responses to direct attacks or imminent threats are likelier to be treated as lawful under Article II, but prolonged or expanding operations risk triggering the War Powers Resolution’s requirements and would raise stronger claims that Congress must authorize sustained hostilities ^{[5] [6]}.

5. What reporting and official steps show about notification and oversight

Official reporting to Congress has at times followed the War Powers Resolution format: the administration submitted 48‑hour notifications or six‑month reports “consistent with” the WPR after some strikes, and shifted justifications over time when escalation risk increased ^[6]. Reuters and other outlets repeatedly describe the pattern: notification after the fact rather than a prior request for congressional authorization ^{[1] [2]}.

6. Competing narratives and implicit agendas

The administration’s framing emphasizes executive flexibility to defend U.S. forces and shipping lanes, and relies on legal interpretations that preserve rapid response; supporters stress the practical need to deter immediate threats ^[5]. Critics in Congress frame the same actions as executive overreach and a weakening of constitutional checks, often with political motivations to force greater legislative involvement or to score partisan points ^{[4] [2]}. Independent outlets and fact‑checkers document both the routine nature of such unilateral strikes and the controversy they generate ^{[8] [9]}.

7. Bottom line and limits of available reporting

Available sources establish that several Biden‑era strikes were carried out without seeking prior congressional approval and that the administration instead notified Congress while invoking Article II, earlier AUMFs, or self‑defense ^{[1] [2] [6]}. Sources do not provide a comprehensive list of every discrete strike and whether each was preceded by notification or debate; available sources do not mention a definitive catalog of all Biden‑era strikes and the precise timing or form of every congressional notification ^{[8] [6]}.

If you want, I can compile a timeline from these sources of the specific strikes cited in reporting (Yemen Jan 2024, Syria Feb 2021, December 2023 Iraq/Syria strikes referenced) and map which ones were notified, which were justified under AUMFs, and which prompted formal congressional demands.