Was a lot of the votes for brexit joke votes, or did a lot of the voters die?
Executive summary
Most evidence shows the 2016 Brexit result was driven by genuine votes, not “joke” ballots, and demographic turnover — older, pro-Leave voters dying and younger, pro-Remain voters entering the roll — has contributed to a measurable decline in aggregate public support for Brexit since 2016 (cohort replacement explains about one-third of that decline over six years) [1] [2]. Available official data do not allow anyone to count how many individual Leave voters have died because the referendum was secret-ballot; the ONS explicitly says it cannot determine how many Leave voters are now deceased [3].
1. The claim that many ballots were “jokes” doesn’t match the evidence
Reports and collections of Brexit “jokes” and memes show strong cultural satire around the vote [4] [5] [6], but those entertainments are separate from the mechanics and turnout of the referendum. Empirical analyses of who voted show clear, consistent demographic patterns — older and less-educated voters disproportionately supported Leave, younger and more-educated voters disproportionately supported Remain — based on survey and post‑vote studies [1] [7]. That pattern supports the conclusion that the vote reflected policy preferences, not mass joke‑voting; available sources do not mention any credible evidence that joke votes were a decisive share of the total [4] [1].
2. You cannot retroactively count how many Leave voters have died
The Office for National Statistics states plainly that because the referendum was secret, “we have no way of determining how many people who voted for Brexit are now deceased” [3]. Third‑party back‑of‑the‑envelope calculations and forum posts attempted to estimate deaths among Leave voters early after the referendum, but those are speculative and cannot replace the legal/technical limit the ONS highlights [8] [3]. Any definitive figure claiming X million Leave voters have died is not supported by official data in the provided reporting [3].
3. Mortality and health correlate with Leave at area level, but that’s not the same as individual deaths changing the 2016 result
Academic studies find statistical associations between higher local rates of “deaths of despair” (drug‑related deaths and suicides) and larger Leave shares at the local‑authority level — a signal of social distress correlated with voting patterns [9] [10]. Separately, ecological papers found districts that voted more heavily Remain had lower COVID‑19 death rates and higher vaccine uptake, while pro‑Leave areas tended to have worse COVID outcomes [11] [12]. These area‑level correlations suggest links between health, trust in experts and political preferences, but they do not demonstrate that individual deaths removed enough Leave votes to change the referendum result [9] [11].
4. Demographic turnover (cohort replacement) changed aggregate support over time
Peer‑reviewed work quantifies that cohort replacement — older, pro‑Leave voters passing away and younger, pro‑Remain voters entering the electorate — explains roughly one‑third of the decline in Brexit support between 2016 and 2022; the remainder reflects people changing their minds within cohorts [2]. Think‑tank and polling analyses back this up: turnout and opinion differences by age were stark in 2016 — e.g., over‑65s heavily favoured Leave while under‑25s favoured Remain — and higher turnout among older voters amplified that effect [1] [13].
5. Competing explanations: persuasion, turnout and disinformation
Scholars and inquiries note multiple mechanisms that produced and later eroded Leave support. Analyses emphasise economic grievance, education and geography as drivers of the Leave vote [14]. Separately, parliamentary and journalistic investigations flagged disinformation and foreign influence as factors raising legitimate concerns about how the campaign was fought, though these do not speak to “joke votes” or mortality counts [15] [7]. Polling shows regret about Brexit has grown in later years, which cannot be explained by deaths alone [16].
6. Bottom line for the original question
The weight of available reporting: (a) a large share of Leave votes were not “joke” ballots — they line up with socioeconomic and demographic patterns documented by surveys and studies [1] [14]; (b) demographic turnover (some older Leave voters dying) has contributed materially to declining aggregate support for Brexit but cannot be precisely counted at the individual‑voter level because the referendum was secret [2] [3]. Any claim that “a lot of the votes were jokes” or that “a lot of the voters died” as a causal explanation for the referendum outcome is unsupported by the sources provided; instead, the evidence points to genuine political divisions, area‑level health correlations, and gradual cohort replacement reshaping public opinion [5] [9] [2].