How is the high speed rail for CA progressing. Has newsom supported or hindered the building of it
Executive summary
California’s high‑speed rail project is actively under construction in the Central Valley with about 119 miles of work and $13.8 billion spent on the Initial Operating Segment (IOS); the state has committed roughly $1 billion a year in recent proposals to stabilize funding through 2045 (project spending and construction data: [1]; state funding pledge: [2], p2_s6). Governor Gavin Newsom has repeatedly shifted from early skepticism to active booster: he has signed laws requiring updated funding plans, defended the project against federal grant terminations and secured state funding commitments, while critics and federal officials have accused the Authority of compliance failures and fiscal risk (Newsom actions: [3], [4], [2]; federal critique and grant termination: [1], p2_s1).
1. Where the rails actually are: construction in the Central Valley
The project’s clearest, measurable progress is the Central Valley “backbone” — about 119 miles of contiguous construction work, dozens of completed civil structures, grade separations and a railhead logistics facility; the Authority says 70 miles (59%) of contiguous guideway are ready for track‑laying and $13.8 billion has been spent on the IOS as of mid‑2025 (construction totals and guideway: [1]; site updates and closures: [5]; railhead and contract milestones: p1_s9).
2. Funding: unstable federal money, new state promises
Federal support has been volatile: a compliance review by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) led to the recommendation to terminate roughly $4 billion in federal grant obligations, with criticisms of missed deadlines and funding shortfalls (FRA review summary: p1_s1). In response, California under Newsom has moved to lock in state funding — proposing and later securing a plan to allocate $1 billion annually through 2045 from cap‑and‑invest revenues to finish the Central Valley segment and advance broader goals (state funding commitment and budget proposals: [2], p2_s6).
3. Newsom’s posture: from skeptic to active booster
Newsom began his public role as a skeptic but now publicly backs building the project. He has signed legislation requiring the Authority to produce updated cost, risk and funding plans (AB 377 signing: p2_s3) and his administration has joined lawsuits and public campaigns to oppose federal grant terminations (state lawsuit and response to termination: [4]; governor’s statement on federal actions: p2_s5). State officials frame these moves as protecting jobs and advancing a climate‑oriented infrastructure priority (governor’s communications: [6], p2_s9).
4. Federal friction and partisan framing
Federal officials have been openly critical. The U.S. Transportation Secretary (per a Department of Transportation op‑ed) called the project a costly failure and justified cutting funding, arguing the project lacked a viable path to timely revenue service (op‑ed and administration stance: p2_s1). California responded with litigation and political messaging asserting the federal actions were political and unlawful (state press statements: p2_s9). Both sides use starkly different narratives — fiscal waste vs. political retribution — and each cites the same fiscal and schedule uncertainties to support its position (federal critique: [1]; state lawsuit and rebuttal: p2_s9).
5. Strategy shift: private capital and revised delivery
Facing both funding gaps and political risk, the High‑Speed Rail Authority is pursuing private investment partnerships and procurement reforms to accelerate construction and change where the first marketable segment might open (CEO outreach to private investors and delivery strategy: [7], [1]0). The Authority argues that a steady state‑level funding stream plus private partners could unlock a new delivery model and potentially change sequencing (private investor discussions and steady funding narrative: [7]; project update and procurement shifts: [1]0).
6. Unresolved risks and competing viewpoints
Available sources document real construction progress but also serious uncertainties: cost estimates for Phase 1 now range broadly ($89–$128 billion) and the FRA concluded there was no viable path to IOS revenue service by 2033 without additional funds (cost ranges and FRA findings: p1_s1). Supporters point to completed structures, job creation and new contracts as proof of momentum (project PR and job numbers: [8], p1_s7). Critics argue Newsom should scale back or abandon portions to avoid further fiscal exposure (opinion pieces and conservative criticism: [9], p2_s1). Both positions are present in the reporting (supportive briefs: [10], [11]; critiques and administration action: [1], p2_s1).
7. Bottom line
The high‑speed rail is neither dead nor finished: construction and procurement milestones are real in the Central Valley, while Newsom has moved from skeptic to active promoter — using legislation, funding proposals and litigation to keep the project alive (construction milestones: [5], [8]; Newsom actions: [3], [4], [12]0). Major funding shortfalls, federal conflict and broad cost uncertainty remain, and the Authority now seeks private capital and delivery changes to bridge the gap (fiscal shortfall, FRA concerns and private‑partner push: [1], [7], [1]0). Available sources do not mention whether any completed Central Valley segment is currently open to passenger service.