Can congress mandate themselves to phisically stay in congress until they decide on a federal budget?

1. What proponents claim and why it sounds plausible

Supporters of a continuous‑presence rule argue that because Congress controls the power of the purse and sets its own procedural rules, it could require members to stay in session until appropriations or a budget resolution are passed. This argument draws on the basic truth that Congress writes its own standing rules and manages floor procedures, and it references the central role of appropriations and the President’s budget submission format to frame why forcing continuous attendance would, in theory, concentrate incentives to finish business. The reviewed materials explain the budget submission process and Congress’s primacy over appropriations, which is the factual basis driving the proposal’s appeal. ^{[1] [2] [3]}

2. Constitutional and statutory obstacles that block a forced stay

The Constitution and federal statutes do not confer a specific power to compel members to remain physically present in the chamber without limitation, and the Appropriations Clause does not create enforcement mechanics for attendance. The sources note that while Congress’s power of the purse is broad, it does not extend to overriding individual members’ liberty or external constitutional safeguards by fiat, and the budget statutes govern submissions and timing rather than floor presence. Absent an express constitutional amendment or statute that survived constitutional scrutiny, a mandatory continuous‑presence rule would face serious legal questions about coercion and separation of powers. ^{[5] [2] [6]}

3. What internal rules and precedents actually allow—tools, not shackles

Congress can and does use procedural tools to influence attendance: quorum rules, voting schedules, pro forma sessions, and incentives like withholding pay for missed votes under certain conditions. The CRS and other procedural analyses show that Congress can change quorum definitions and adopt rules on debate and voting, which may increase pressure to conclude appropriations, but these tools are not the same as a legally enforceable order that keeps members physically locked to the chamber until a budget passes. Past practices rely on incentives and sanctions within House and Senate rules rather than absolute physical compulsion. ^{[4] [7] [8]}

4. Practical and enforcement problems that make a “stay‑in” unworkable

Even if Congress adopted a rule requiring continuous presence, enforcing it would be fraught: individual members’ constitutional rights, logistical needs, and the political risk of circumventing rules would undercut effectiveness. The AEI and CRS discussions highlight that quorum rules and continuity plans can be adapted, but physical compulsion raises operational and legal challenges, including how to treat emergencies, remote participation concerns, and whether penalties like loss of pay would hold up if challenged. Practical governance considerations mean Congress favors procedural levers and negotiation over draconian physical mandates. ^{[8] [4] [3]}

5. Bottom line: feasible alternatives that achieve the same goal

The realistic path to ensure timely budgets is procedural reform, not enforced sequestration of members: adopt automatic continuing resolutions with clear triggers, tighten appropriations deadlines, impose pay penalties through clearly structured rule changes, or change quorum definitions to prevent minority obstruction. These approaches use existing constitutional and statutory authority to increase pressure for timely action without raising the same constitutional and enforceability questions as an across‑the‑board stay‑in requirement. The sources consistently show preference for procedural changes and incentives rather than coercive physical mandates. ^{[3] [5] [1]}