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Fact check: Can a continuing resolution with amendments be used to increase funding for specific programs?
Executive Summary
A continuing resolution (CR) can be crafted to increase funding for specific programs, but doing so is contingent on congressional agreement and political tradeoffs; CRs often include targeted amendments or “anomalies” that adjust particular accounts even while preserving overall stopgap funding structures [1] [2]. Recent legislative examples and analyses show Congress has both added program-specific increases and withheld or reduced funding in CRs, making the practical outcome dependent on the text of the CR and the bargaining context in which it is passed [1] [3] [4]. The sources supplied document instances where CRs raised some program funding, extended authorities, and also cut or reallocated funds, illustrating that CRs are flexible tools but politically constrained [1] [5] [2].
1. Extracting the Competing Claims — What proponents and critics assert about CR flexibility
The materials present two clear claims: first, CRs are primarily stopgap instruments that continue government operations at prior or reduced funding levels; second, CRs have been used to insert amendments that increase funding for specific programs or extend authorities beyond baseline continuation funding. Analyses of recent CRs note explicit increases to programs—such as targeted boosts in agriculture and FDA-related accounts—and concurrent reductions elsewhere, including the removal of earmarks that reduced non-defense spending overall [1]. Other source summaries emphasize that CRs can and do extend expiring programs and authorities, including major health care program provisions, suggesting both routine continuation and selective augmentation are part of CR practice [5] [4]. These competing claims are not mutually exclusive: the factual pattern is that CRs can carry both continuation and selective augmentation, depending on legislative choices.
2. Concrete Evidence that CRs have been used to raise program funding
Multiple of the supplied analyses document CRs with explicit program funding increases and anomalies. The Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, is cited as increasing appropriations for specific areas — Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, and FDA-related accounts rose from $26.2 billion in FY2024 to $26.6 billion — even as the same measure reduced non-defense spending by about $13 billion through earmark removals [1]. Other records of recent continuing appropriations show authorities extended for public health, Medicare, and Medicaid and identify statutory language that provides flexibility and additional appropriations for prioritized programs [5] [3]. Analysts explicitly note that CRs sometimes include “anomalies” permitting agencies to obligate funds for items not normally funded under a strict CR framework, demonstrating legislative precedent for program-specific increases within stopgap bills [2].
3. Examples, mechanics, and statutory flexibility — how increases are implemented in CRs
The sources describe several mechanisms by which CRs alter funding: inserting specific line items or riders that earmark extra funds, adding statutory language that extends authorities or eligibility for programs, and drafting anomalies that exempt particular accounts from standard CR limitations [4] [2]. The Continuing Appropriations Act and other extension statutes historically modified laws related to aviation revenues and higher education, showing CRs can function as vehicles for targeted legislative change while preserving broader funding continuity [3] [4]. However, the existence of these mechanisms does not guarantee increases; each addition requires agreement among House and Senate negotiators and, often, the White House. Thus the legal flexibility to increase funding exists, but its use is shaped by negotiation and policy priorities reflected in the CR text [2].
4. Political tradeoffs and real-world limits — why increases are contested and uneven
The provided analyses show that when CRs include increases they frequently accompany cuts elsewhere or policy compromises. In the 2025 measure, for example, specific program increases were offset by a broader reduction in non-defense spending tied to the elimination of earmarks [1]. Health-sector debates around CRs illustrate the political stakes: extensions of premium subsidies, DSH adjustments, and other health program funding have been bargaining chips in CR negotiations, with potential downstream effects on premiums and state programs if not extended [6] [5]. These examples reveal that increases are politically costly and typically reflect prioritization by the dominant negotiators rather than a neutral rule allowing easy augmentation of any program through a CR.
5. Bottom line: What readers should conclude about using CRs to increase program funding
Continuing resolutions can be and have been used to increase funding for specific programs, but such increases require explicit statutory language or riders, congressional agreement, and often compensating offsets or cuts elsewhere, meaning they are pragmatic exceptions rather than routine features of CRs [1] [2]. The supplied sources document both precedent and limitations: CRs extended authorities and raised targeted accounts in recent years, yet these adjustments happened amid bargaining that also produced program reductions and policy tradeoffs [1] [5] [4]. Readers should therefore view CRs as flexible legislative instruments capable of program-specific funding increases, but recognize that achieving such increases depends on political negotiation and the specific language enacted into law [1] [2].