Can independent commissions fully eliminate gerrymandering in the US?

1. Independent commissions reduce partisan map‑drawing, but results vary by design

Independent commissions have produced “fairer maps” in states like California and Michigan and are credited with reducing obvious partisan gerrymanders; advocates and experts point to transparency features—public hearings, data disclosure, citizen input—as core strengths ^{[1] [4]}. Yet commissions differ widely: some are advisory only (Iowa, Maine), some exclude elected officials, and some are hybrid bodies that share power with legislatures, so the anti‑gerrymander effect depends on legal powers and membership rules ^{[5] [4]}.

2. Courts and state constitutions matter — federal courts largely out of the partisan gerrymandering business

The Supreme Court’s Rucho decision removed federal judicial policing of partisan gerrymanders, shifting disputes to state courts and constitutions; that makes commission protections only as durable as state legal frameworks and the willingness of state judiciaries to enforce anti‑partisan rules ^[6]. State courts have had mixed results: some struck down gerrymanders, while others (like South Carolina’s Supreme Court in 2025) have ruled partisan gerrymandering does not violate state law, leaving maps intact ^{[7] [6]}.

3. Political actors can bypass or override commissions through legislatures, amendments, or mid‑decade remapping

Even well‑crafted commissions face political countermeasures: California voters in 2025 considered Proposition 50 to temporarily override the independent commission and allow a legislature‑drawn map, and lawmakers in Virginia pursued a constitutional amendment to transfer redistricting authority back to the legislature ^{[8] [3] [2]}. Mid‑decade redistricting pushes in Texas and Missouri demonstrate how state governments can redraw maps outside the post‑census cycle, undermining commission stability unless federal law or state constitutions constrain such moves ^{[9] [6]}.

4. Federal legislation could standardize commissions but faces political hurdles

Proposals such as the Redistricting Reform Act of 2025 aim to require nonpartisan IRCs in every state and ban mid‑decade remapping, specifying structures (e.g., 15 commissioners evenly split among majority, minority, and unaffiliated groups) ^{[9] [10]}. Supporters argue national rules would end partisan gerrymanders; opponents and practical politics could block such federal mandates, and even uniform federal rules would contend with state constitutional processes and litigation dynamics ^{[9] [10]}.

5. Litigation still reshapes outcomes — commissions are not a courtroom shield

Legal challenges often follow any map regardless of who drew it; courts have both struck down aggressive gerrymanders and allowed others to stand, so commissions do not immunize maps from judicial review on racial or other constitutional grounds ^{[7] [11]}. The uneven success of lawsuits means commissions reduce opportunities for blatant partisan engineering but cannot guarantee maps will survive every court or political test.

6. Practical takeaway: commissions lower—but do not eliminate—political influence

Practical experience across states shows commissions can reduce extreme partisan manipulation and increase transparency, but they are vulnerable to political override, varying legal standards, and strategic responses (legislative amendments, ballot measures, mid‑decade remaps) that can recreate partisan effects ^{[1] [2] [6]}. The net effect is significant reduction in some states, continued struggle and contestation in others, and an ongoing tug‑of‑war that commissions alone cannot definitively end ^{[4] [5]}.

Limitations and unanswered points

Available sources document examples, proposals, and legal shifts through 2025 but do not present a single, nationwide empirical estimate of how much gerrymandering commissions would eliminate in all fifty states; quantifying “fully eliminate” is not found in current reporting (not found in current reporting).