Can the President unilaterally keep the government open without appropriations?

1. Why the purse strings matter — Congress's exclusive role and the constitutional frame

The Constitution vests spending authority with Congress, and modern explanations emphasize that allocation power controls whether federal operations can be funded. Analysts summarize that Article I, Section 9 places primary appropriations authority with Congress while the President’s duty is to execute laws Congress enacts, which means the President lacks constitutional authority to unilaterally create funding where Congress has not authorized it ^{[1] [5]}. Commentaries and legal summaries reiterate that the fundamental design of federal budgeting is legislative control over resources; the executive branch administers funds Congress provides but cannot override the statutory requirement that money be appropriated before it is spent. This constitutional baseline forms the starting point for statutory rules and agency practice described elsewhere in the record ^{[1] [5]}.

2. Statutory brakes — the Antideficiency Act and the Impoundment Control Act

Statutory law reinforces the constitutional division. The Antideficiency Act forbids federal employees from obligating or spending funds absent congressional appropriation, and contemporary reporting explains that this law is a practical barrier to any unilateral executive effort to keep agencies operating without new appropriations ^[2]. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 adds procedural constraints on the President’s ability to refuse to spend funds Congress has appropriated, requiring reporting and providing Congress mechanisms to override impoundments ^{[6] [3]}. Together these statutes mean neither omission nor presidential direction can legally substitute for an appropriation, and the executive’s discretion over when and whether to spend is tightly circumscribed by statute and reporting obligations ^{[6] [3]}.

3. How experts and institutions describe shutdown mechanics — the President’s limited toolbox

Summaries of shutdown mechanics across the materials make the same operational point: a government shutdown results when Congress fails to pass appropriations or a continuing resolution, and the President cannot by fiat keep the government funded. Reports explain that to avoid or end a shutdown, Congress must pass funding measures and the President must sign them into law, because the budgetary process and Antideficiency Act govern agency authority to operate ^{[2] [6]}. Multiple entries reiterate this process-based conclusion in slightly different language, underscoring the institutional reality that the presidency lacks unilateral spending authority to bypass the legislative appropriations process ^{[6] [7]}.

4. Points of disagreement and nuance — what parts of the record differ, and why it matters

The assembled analyses present minor differences in emphasis rather than true legal contradiction. One summary clarifies that the Impoundment Control Act “does not restrict the president's ability to impound funds” but then explains the Act sets the procedure by which a president can seek to alter spending via expedited reporting to Congress, concluding the president still cannot unilaterally refuse to spend appropriated funds ^[4]. Other sources emphasize that the Act was designed precisely to limit unilateral presidential impoundment and provide Congress an override route ^{[3] [6]}. The divergence reflects interpretive emphasis — whether the Act is framed as procedural versus substantive restraint — but all sources agree the net effect is a legal limitation on unilateral executive funding choices.

5. Practical takeaways and institutional incentives — why actors behave the way they do

The practical materials show why Presidents and Congress behave predictably: absent appropriations, agencies stop or scale back operations under the Antideficiency Act, and Congress faces political pressure to pass stopgap measures or full appropriations. Reports and FAQs repeatedly state that ending a shutdown requires legislative action followed by the President’s signature, making the presidency unable to unilaterally keep the government open in normal legal terms ^{[2] [7]}. The U.S. budget process therefore forces political bargaining in Congress, constrained by statutory rules that prevent executive unilateralism; the result is recurring political standoffs rather than an executive remedy to fund government without congressional approval ^{[2] [6]}.