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Fact check: Could Trump approve thepre approved federal funds that were designed to keep SNAP benefits going in case of an emergency or disaster without any action from Congress
Executive Summary
The core claim — that former President Trump could approve pre‑approved federal contingency funds to keep SNAP benefits flowing without Congressional action — is partly true in concept but limited in practice: statutory contingency funds and SNAP emergency allotments exist and have been invoked administratively, yet the Trump administration in late October 2025 declined to tap those funds, and legal and statutory constraints make unilateral presidential action legally contested and operationally constrained [1] [2] [3]. Multiple legal experts and Democratic officials argued the contingency pot was designed for exactly this purpose and that refusing to use it risks harm to 42 million recipients, while the administration maintained it would not exercise that authority, prompting lawsuits and local emergency responses [4] [5] [1].
1. Why advocates say a president can keep SNAP running in a shutdown — and why it matters
Advocates point to statutory authorities and administrative precedent that allow the Secretary of Agriculture—and by extension, an administration—to deploy emergency allotments and contingency funds to maintain SNAP operations during emergencies, a mechanism used during the COVID era and described by USDA guidance as available for economic crises [3] [6]. Legal scholars and Democratic lawmakers argue that the contingency pool — reported as roughly $5–6 billion across accounts — was explicitly intended to prevent lapses in benefit delivery when Congress fails to enact appropriations on time, and they framed refusal to use the fund as inconsistent with Congressional intent and harmful to households relying on SNAP, estimated at 42 million people [2] [4]. Localities such as Seattle moved to declare limited emergencies and allocate municipal funds to backstop food programs when federal contingency funds were not released, underscoring the immediate human impact of administrative choices and the political stakes of whether those funds are tapped [5].
2. Why the administration declined and the legal gray areas that followed
The Trump administration publicly declined to access the contingency pool, stating it would not tap emergency funds to cover SNAP during the lapse, a decision reported in contemporaneous coverage and reflected in federal messaging, though some reports are error-marked or incomplete in the record [1] [7]. Legal analyses highlight ambiguities: Title 7 and related statutes assign responsibilities to the Secretary of Agriculture for emergency food programs but do not provide an unqualified presidential switch to spend funds without appropriation in all circumstances; Congressional language and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2023 changed emergency allotment authority and required waivers tied to public health declarations, complicating a straightforward invocation of past pandemic-era flexibilities [8] [6]. These statutory wrinkles are central to why the administration chose not to act and why courts and scholars differ on legal compulsion versus discretionary authority [2].
3. The political framing: claims of illegality vs. administrative discretion
Democratic officials and legal experts characterized the refusal as “cruel and illegal,” arguing the contingency fund’s plain meaning and Congressional intent authorized release to prevent interruption of benefits, framing the administration’s choice as a political, not legal, failure to protect vulnerable Americans [2] [4]. The administration’s position framed the question as one of executive discretion and fiscal restraint, asserting it would not unilaterally spend contingency funds in lieu of Congressional appropriations—a stance that proponents say is legally dubious but that opponents defend as an acceptable executive check on spending absent explicit appropriation. This clash prompted legal action from state officials seeking court orders to compel funding and produced public statements and municipal emergency measures to blunt immediate impacts [1] [5].
4. Court responses, municipal backstops, and immediate consequences
A federal judge signaled that the administration might be required to partially fund SNAP benefits, reflecting judicial willingness to scrutinize executive refusal to use contingency mechanisms, though final rulings and enforcement timelines remained uncertain as lawsuits proceeded [9]. Meanwhile, cities like Seattle declared limited emergencies and used local resources to sustain food programs while federal mechanisms remained unused, demonstrating practical strain on nonfederal actors and the cascading consequences of administrative decisions even before definitive judicial resolution [5]. These parallel responses illustrate how legal ambiguity and political choice translate rapidly into operational gaps that fall on state and local governments and civil society.
5. Bottom line: legal options exist but practical and political limits matter
In sum, statutory tools and past administrative practice establish that contingency funds and emergency allotments can be used to sustain SNAP without immediate Congressional action, but statutory changes, waiver requirements, and contested legal interpretations limit unfettered presidential or administrative authority; the Trump administration’s October 2025 refusal to deploy those funds sparked lawsuits, local emergency measures, and sharp political criticism that emphasized the human consequences for millions of beneficiaries [3] [6] [2] [1]. The dispute is now a mix of legal argument, judicial intervention, and political pressure rather than a simple technical question: the funds exist, they can be used administratively in some circumstances, but invoking them is neither automatic nor uncontroversial. [4] [1]