How did the chain of command between Capitol Police, Capitol Police Board, and congressional leaders affect guard deployment decisions?
Executive summary
The chain of command — a complex overlay of the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP), the Capitol Police Board, and Department of Defense (DoD) actors — created both legal and practical impediments that slowed National Guard deployment on January 6, 2021; decisions about whether and how to use Guard forces were routed through formal authorities, pre-existing restrictions, and contested communications that produced delays [1] [2] [3]. Competing priorities and fear of “optics,” plus miscommunications among senior Pentagon officials, amplified those structural limits even after urgent requests from USCP leadership [4] [5] [6].
1. Institutional lines: who technically controlled the Guard and when
Authority to request and approve DC National Guard assistance on behalf of the Capitol rested in practice with the Capitol Police Board—made up of the Architect of the Capitol and the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms—because the chief of the USCP lacked independent authority to federally activate Guard forces for the Capitol until statutory changes after January 6 [1] [2]. From the DoD side, ultimate operational approval for Guard movement funneled upward to Army and Defense Department decision-makers; senior Army and Defense officials had to clear Guard deployments beyond local activation, creating a separate vertical command that intersected awkwardly with the Board’s authority [7] [3].
2. Pre-event restrictions shaped the response calculus
In the days before January 6, legal and policy constraints were stacked against quick use of DC National Guard troops at the Capitol: the Guard was activated on limited terms (nonlethal, crowd-management, traffic duties) and DoD leadership imposed extra written constraints about equipment and deployment without senior approvals — measures that left commanders with little discretion in a fast-moving riot [2] [8] [4]. Those constraints were not merely technical; they reflected institutional caution after 2020 protests and explicit concerns about the president “re-missioning” federal forces, a political consideration that informed how DoD and Army leaders designed the chain of command [4] [6].
3. On January 6, the board-to-chief-to-Pentagon pathway created delays
As the attack unfolded, USCP Chief Steven Sund repeatedly sought Guard help but had to secure permission within the Capitol Police Board before formally requesting the National Guard — the Board did not authorize that formal request until roughly 2:10 p.m., more than an hour after Sund’s initial urgent appeals, which limited how quickly the DoD could act [9] [10] [11]. Separately, testimony and timelines document a critical miscommunication at the Pentagon between Defense Secretary Christopher Miller and Secretary of the Army Ryan McCarthy that left commanders with different understandings of who had authority to order movement, producing an effective four-hour lag before Guard forces reached the Capitol [5] [7].
4. Competing narratives: miscommunication, caution, and “optics”
Officials disagree about why the guard’s arrival was delayed: Pentagon spokespeople and some reports argue procedural necessity and a lack of an earlier formal request explain timing, while Guard commanders and other witnesses describe “frantic” requests that went unanswered and point to restrictions and senior hesitancy rooted in political concerns about optics or misuse of forces [3] [2] [6]. Investigations found that debates and “run it up the chain” responses within the Board and at the Pentagon meant tactical decisions that could have been made more quickly stayed bottled up in institutional layers [1] [11].
5. Consequences, reforms, and lingering accountability questions
The operational consequences were stark: Guard troops did not arrive on the Capitol grounds until late afternoon after police and MPD largely stabilized the situation, and multiple official reviews tied those outcomes to the interplay of Board authority, DoD restrictions, and on-the-ground communications failures [5] [3]. Congress later changed the rules: the Capitol Police Emergency Assistance Act of 2021 gave the USCP chief clearer authority to request Guard support without the Board’s prior approval — a statutory fix acknowledging that the pre-January 6 chain of command hindered rapid force deployment [2] [1]. Still, alternative accounts persist about the degree to which political motives versus bureaucratic confusion were decisive, and several after-action reports and testimonies continue to contest responsibility among Capitol officials, the Board, and senior military leadership [6] [5].