What role did Capitol Police and House security officials play in requesting or denying Guard support on Jan. 6?
This fact-check may be outdated. Consider refreshing it to get the most current information.
Executive summary
Capitol Police and House/security officials played a central but contested role in both declining pre-event National Guard offers and delaying formal Guard deployment during the Jan. 6 attack. Multiple official reviews say the Capitol Police Board’s approval process and unclear authorities contributed to hours-long delays in Guard arrival; the Pentagon offered Guard support as early as Jan. 3 and was told it was not needed, and Chief Steven Sund later sought approvals amid the attack [1] [2] [3].
1. What offers were made — and who said “no” before Jan. 6
Three days before the attack, the Department of Defense twice asked whether the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) needed National Guard manpower; the Pentagon says the USCP declined the Jan. 3 offer [1]. Pentagon timelines and contemporaneous reporting show DOD proactively asked and were told additional Guard support would not be requested at that time [4] [1]. FactCheck and other timelines confirm USCP repeatedly communicated that DOD support was not necessary in the days leading up to Jan. 6 [5].
2. The legal and bureaucratic chokepoint: the Capitol Police Board
Multiple post‑attack reviews found a structural obstacle: by statute and practice the Capitol Police Chief needed the Capitol Police Board’s approval to request D.C. National Guard assistance, and board members disagreed about whether unanimity was required and did not understand the rules they were supposed to apply [2] [3]. The Senate report and GAO reviews criticized the board’s confusion and recommended clarifying who can make urgent requests [3] [6]. Congress later changed that authority in law, granting the USCP chief clearer emergency power to seek Guard help [7].
3. What happened during the attack — requests, calls, and delays
As the assault unfolded, Chief Steven Sund repeatedly sought assistance and engaged in extensive calls with the House Sergeant at Arms and other officials; committees found delays while Sund tried to contact board members and obtain required approvals [2]. A Senate account recounts hours of calls between Capitol officials and Pentagon leaders while Sund “desperately begged for help,” and the Guard did not arrive in force for several hours [3]. Pentagon timelines show some DC National Guard elements were mobilized and staged late afternoon after multiple approvals; troops began support operations only after a sequence of authorizations from the SECARMY and the acting Defense Secretary [4].
4. Competing narratives and political finger‑pointing
Political leaders offered different versions of who blocked or delayed Guard deployment. House leaders and the Capitol Police framed the matter as an operational approval process; Speaker Pelosi’s office and fact‑checks say she did not block the Guard and that she supported deployment when recommended [8]. Some defense officials and later witnesses disputed others’ accounts about when and by whom final deployment authority was granted, and then‑Acting Secretary Christopher Miller later disputed claims about prior authorization [9] [10]. Available sources document contradictory public statements and internal disputes but do not fully reconcile every individual claim [9] [10].
5. Why the process mattered — tactical consequences and reforms
Reviews concluded the inability of the USCP chief to unilaterally secure Guard or outside federal resources hampered a faster response, contributing to the prolonged breach and to later legislative fixes. The Capitol Police Emergency Assistance Act and other procedural changes were enacted to allow the USCP chief clearer emergency authority to request National Guard assistance without waiting for the board [7] [3]. GAO and Senate reports also flagged inadequate planning and unclear procedures as root causes [6] [3].
6. Limits of current reporting and obvious gaps
Public reports document the offers, refusals, and procedural confusion, but they do not supply verbatim transcripts of many key conversations (committees noted missing recordings of some calls) or fully settle all competing recollections about timing and who precisely authorized each step [2] [3]. Available sources do not mention full contemporaneous logs of every phone call between Sund and board members that would eliminate remaining disputes [2].
Bottom line: official timelines and oversight reports agree on two clear facts—DoD offered Guard support before Jan. 6 and was told it was not needed, and during the attack the Capitol Police chief faced procedural hurdles in obtaining Guard forces, producing delays that reviews judged significant—while political actors offered competing explanations about who bore responsibility [1] [3] [2].