How does the CBO estimate uptake from CRSC to concurrent receipt and what behavioral assumptions drive its cost estimate?
Executive summary
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates uptake from Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) to broader concurrent receipt (CRDP/CRDP-like expansions) by projecting the number of retirees eligible under the proposed change and applying behavioral assumptions about who would switch or newly claim benefits; that projection, together with per-recipient payment estimates, produces the budgetary cost estimate [1] [2]. The agency’s approach relies on administrative counts of current CRSC/CRDP recipients, statutory eligibility rules, and standard assumptions about take-up and claimant behavior—assumptions that critics say can overstate costs if they ignore phased enrollments or voluntary choice dynamics [3] [4].
1. How CBO translates eligibility into projected uptake and dollars
CBO begins with counts and characteristics of the affected population—how many retirees currently receive CRSC or CRDP, how many veterans receive VA disability but aren’t eligible for concurrent pay, and related cohort flows—and then applies the statutory changes to determine who becomes newly eligible or who would change payment streams under the bill; those headcounts are multiplied by estimated annual payments to produce the cost over the budget window [3] [2]. For example, CBO and CRS cite universe figures—hundreds of thousands of retirees receiving CRSC/CRDP and other retirees with VA compensation—that form the base for simulation, and past CBO estimates of sweeping changes to concurrent receipt produce multi‑billion dollar price tags [5] [6].
2. The behavioral levers embedded in the estimate
Behavioral assumptions are central: CBO must decide how many eligible people will actually switch programs, apply for benefits, or change their use of VA services as a result of law changes. In some prior analyses CBO explicitly models the possibility that eliminating or changing concurrent receipt would alter incentives to apply for VA compensation or to accept different pay options, noting that some veterans “might bypass” VA claims or services if concurrent receipt were unavailable or less attractive [1]. CBO also uses standard policy‑estimate practices—assuming plausible take‑up rates when not every eligible person enrolls—while documenting those assumptions in its cost explanations [7] [8].
3. Data, modeling practice, and institutional norms that shape the projection
CBO’s practice is to rely on administrative data (DoD and VA counts), consultation with outside experts, and internally developed models to translate eligibility into expected fiscal flows; it documents methods and the basis for judgments in each estimate and adapts models as better data arrive [9] [8]. That means the final dollar figure is not a raw tally but the output of a modeling process in which CBO chooses parameters—phase‑in timing, take‑up rates, and interaction effects with other VA programs—based on precedent, analogous policy changes, and expert input [7] [9].
4. Critiques and competing assumptions: the MOAA example
Stakeholders such as the Military Officers Association of America (MOAA) dispute specific CBO choices, arguing that CBO’s fiscal math sometimes assumes full conversion—i.e., that all who become newly eligible will switch from CRSC to concurrent receipt—without accounting for DFAS open seasons, phased implementation, or individual tax and family situations that would lead many to remain with CRSC; MOAA asserts CBO effectively assumes all ~52,304 affected Chapter 61 CRSC recipients would switch [4]. CBO’s response is procedural: it must disclose the basis for its estimate and typically explains the behavioral assumptions it used, but different plausible assumptions (partial take‑up, phased enrollment) would produce lower cost estimates [7] [8].
5. Bottom line and key uncertainties
CBO’s cost for shifting CRSC recipients into concurrent receipt hinges on two linked judgments: the headcount of newly eligible people drawn from DoD/VA records and the behavioral assumption about how many of those people would opt to switch or newly claim, including foregone or increased take‑up of related VA services; while CBO documents and defends those choices as standard practice, stakeholders can and do challenge the take‑up rates and phase‑in assumptions, making the headline dollar figure sensitive to reasonable alternate assumptions [1] [4]. Available sources make clear how CBO frames its work and where the levers are, but they do not provide the single “correct” take‑up rate—only the agency’s documented judgment and the counterarguments offered by affected groups [9] [7].