China has made many substantive efforts in governing the country according to law and has indeed achieved results.

1. Legislative and planning momentum: law-by-design at scale

Since the Party elevated “Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law” into central guidance, Beijing has produced multi-year plans, priority legislative agendas and digital law databases to systematize statutes and make implementation more uniform—actions documented in the official annual reports and the Plan on Building the Rule of Law (2020–2025) ^{[1] [6] [7]}. Chinese state media and organs explicitly tie these moves to higher-level political goals—codifying market rules, clarifying administrative responsibilities, and preparing foreign‑related legal frameworks for the next Five‑Year Plan period ^{[8] [9]}.

2. Concrete regulatory updates and institutional upgrades

Practical outputs are tangible: the Civil Code, upgrades to the national legal database, and the sweeping 2026 amendments to the Cybersecurity Law expand regulatory reach, tighten incident-reporting timelines and broaden jurisdictional claims over overseas conduct deemed to affect China’s cybersecurity ^{[2] [7] [3] [10]}. Authorities also highlight operational wins—such as campaigns against transnational telecom fraud and improved business‑environment rankings—as evidence that legal reforms produced social and economic benefits ^{[1] [2]}.

3. The “foreign‑related rule of law”: strategic legalization of external policy

Scholars chart the rise of a distinct “foreign‑related rule of law” which Beijing treats as a toolbox to facilitate trade, dispute resolution and geopolitical defense, a project driven as much by strategic state interests as by neutral legal development ^[4]. Interviews with legal officials and opinion pieces signal an intent to make China a hub for international dispute resolution, but they also underscore the instrumentalist nature of these efforts—law shaped to serve foreign‑policy and economic goals ^{[9] [4]}.

4. Where the model diverges from liberal rule‑of‑law standards

Multiple analyses caution that China’s model remains “socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics,” where the Party’s leadership defines legal boundaries and rejects separation of powers; legal reforms occur within that political frame rather than under an independent judiciary or an open contestation of power ^{[5] [11]}. Critical observers point out the gap between improved statutory architecture and safeguards for political and civil liberties—areas where international indexes and human‑rights scholars continue to find limitations ^{[12] [13]}.

5. Results versus control: gains are real but conditional

Empirically, greater predictability for businesses, more systematic legislation, and improved administrative coordination are real outputs credited by state sources and some outside observers, and they matter for commerce and governance ^{[2] [1]}. At the same time, independent scholarship frames these gains as conditional: legal modernization is nested within a political project that prioritizes stability, state authority and strategic control, which can limit judicial independence and constrain rights that liberal rule‑of‑law frameworks protect ^{[4] [5] [11]}.

6. Bottom line: substantive efforts and uneven achievement

China has undeniably enacted sweeping legal reforms, new laws, upgraded infrastructure for legal information and concrete regulatory frameworks that produce measurable administrative and business outcomes—achievements Beijing and allied commentators foreground ^{[1] [3] [7] [2]}. But those substantive efforts operate within a Party‑led legal architecture whose objectives include political control and geopolitical strategy; whether this constitutes “governing according to law” depends on the definition used—procedural and institutional progress is evident, but liberal conceptions of rule‑of‑law protections for political pluralism and judicial independence are not met according to many external analyses ^{[6] [4] [5] [11]}.