Is classical realism still relevant to modern international relations?
Executive summary
Classical realism—rooted in Thucydides, Machiavelli and 20th‑century thinkers like Morgenthau—views international politics as driven by states’ pursuit of power and a pessimistic reading of human nature, and it remains a live interpretive lens for many contemporary observers of great‑power competition [1] [2] [3]. Yet its state‑centric assumptions and emphasis on timeless human drives have been challenged by the rise of non‑state actors, institutions, and structural (neorealist) or hybrid accounts that aim to explain variation in state behavior [4] [5] [6].
1. What classical realism claims and why it mattered
Classical realism contends that human nature inclines toward self‑interest and conflict, so states—viewed as primary, rational actors—seek power to survive in an anarchic international system, an account formalized by figures such as Hans Morgenthau and traced back to Thucydides [2] [3] [1]. That intellectual framing supplied mid‑20th century foreign‑policy analysts a practical toolkit—balance‑of‑power reasoning, prudence in diplomacy, skepticism about moralistic foreign policy—that shaped both scholarship and policy debates after World War II [7] [2].
2. Where classical realism still illuminates world politics
Classical realist heuristics continue to illuminate contests where raw capabilities, strategic calculation and fear dominate: the U.S.–China competition, a resurgent Russia under Putin, and regional balancing dynamics are commonly read through power‑politics logic that classical realism foregrounds [8] [9]. Its appeal endures because it supplies parsimonious explanations for why states prioritize security, why alliances shift, and why military force remains a continuing instrument of statecraft [10] [9].
3. Empirical and theoretical limits exposed by the contemporary world
But classical realism’s explanatory reach is constrained: scholars note it downplays non‑state actors (international organizations, transnational firms, civil society), underestimates how norms and institutions can modify incentives, and can be overly pessimistic about cooperation enabled by economic interdependence and law [4] [10]. Critics argue that events like cross‑border terrorism, globalization, and influential international institutions pose challenges to a theory that treats the state as the only meaningful actor and power maximization as the default motive [4] [10].
4. How the literature adapted: neorealism and hybrids
The classical realist project did not die so much as metamorphose: neorealism recast realist insights into a systemic, more “scientific” framework focused on structure rather than human nature, while later neoclassical and synthetic approaches try to marry structural pressures with domestic politics and norms to account for variation in state behavior [5] [6]. These intellectual moves acknowledge classical realism’s core intuition about power but correct for its blind spots by adding levels of analysis and causal mechanisms [6] [11].
5. Norms, institutions and the policy realist: competing practical logics
In policy terms, realism’s caution about idealistic interventions still influences statecraft—officials often default to balance‑of‑power reasoning even while publicly invoking norms and cooperation—yet practitioners increasingly layer realist security calculations with institutional tools, economic statecraft, and coalition politics that classical realism did not fully theorize [9] [2]. This duality helps explain why realist language persists in policy debates even as governments rely on multilateral mechanisms and economic interdependence.
6. Verdict: relevance with qualifications
Classical realism remains relevant as a foundational interpretive framework: its focus on power, anarchy and prudence supplies enduring lenses for understanding great‑power rivalry and security dilemmas [1] [8]. However, its explanatory monopoly has been supplanted; modern IR scholarship and practice treat classical realism as one necessary—but neither sufficient nor exclusive—tool among structural, institutional, constructivist and domestic‑level explanations that together better capture the complexities of 21st‑century international relations [5] [4] [6].