Yes — claims that the U.S. is in a "cold civil war" caused by Trump and MAGA, escalating toward violence.

1. A charged phrase with multiple meanings

Writers and pundits use “cold civil war” to describe prolonged political polarization, institutional sabotage, and regional policy divergence rather than immediate battlefield conflict; outlets from The American Prospect to Claremont Review and individual commentators deploy the term to capture an array of nonkinetic struggles over institutions and culture ^{[4] [5] [6] [7]}. Those usages emphasize a structural contest over governance and norms rather than the standard academic definition of civil war, which requires large‑scale, organized armed conflict and thresholds like 1,000 battlefield deaths ^[3].

2. What the polling and social‑science evidence shows

Population‑representative surveys and preprints consistently show MAGA‑identified Republicans are significantly more likely than others to endorse political violence and to expect civil war: one peer‑reviewed study reported 58.2% of MAGA Republicans “consider violence usually/always justified” for at least one political objective and 30.3% “strongly/very strongly” agreed a civil war will occur in the next few years ^{[1] [2]}. A UC Davis preprint and affiliated reports corroborate higher endorsement of violence, racist and conspiratorial beliefs, and greater likelihood of anticipating being armed in violent settings among MAGA Republicans ^{[8] [9]}.

3. Expert cautions against conflating rhetoric with imminent civil war

Policy scholars and think tanks stress a vital distinction: rhetoric, violent episodes, and militia activity differ from an organized internal war meeting scholarly criteria. The Center for Strategic and International Studies judged the risk of an actual U.S. civil war in 2025 “negligible,” noting core civil‑war metrics (organized opposition, sustained battlefield deaths) are absent ^[3]. Other academic commentators call the “cold civil war” a useful metaphor to study polarization and state‑level policy divergence but warn against category errors that exaggerate the likelihood of full‑scale war ^{[6] [10]}.

4. Incidents, incentives, and the direction of escalation

Reporting catalogues episodes of political violence, vigilantism, and militia activity in the MAGA era, and commentators warn that normalization or legal protections for vigilantism can create incentives for more violence ^{[11] [12]}. Advocacy groups and journals emphasize that MAGA movement leaders and associated militant groups have a history—Jan. 6 prosecutions, Proud Boys indictments—linking the movement to violent tactics, which elevates concern even if broader civil‑war thresholds are unmet ^{[13] [11]}.

5. Political leadership, language, and the risk landscape

Critics argue that incendiary presidential rhetoric and framing of domestic opponents as “the enemy within” can erode norms and raise the risk of violent escalation; multiple essays and analyses tie such language to the possibility of state overreach or misuse of security powers ^{[14] [15] [16]}. Conversely, other analysts portray some of this language as rhetorical strategy—a way to marshal political support and expand executive authority—urging caution in translating bellicose metaphors into predictions of imminent civil war ^{[10] [3]}.

6. Competing narratives and hidden incentives

Media and political actors have incentives to amplify either the threat (to mobilize supporters or justify crackdowns) or to downplay it (to avoid panic, protect political legitimacy). Some outlets frame “civil war” talk as strategic spectacle that grants political actors justification for emergency powers; others highlight real indicators—surveys, militia activity—that demand policy responses focused on prevention and de‑radicalization ^{[10] [1] [8]}.

7. What the record does and does not show right now

Available sources show rising endorsement of political violence among MAGA‑aligned groups and episodic political violence since 2016, but they do not document the organized, sustained, interstate armed conflict that scholars define as civil war. Think‑tank analysis labels the near‑term risk negligible, while social‑science data indicates a meaningful, measurable threat vector that policymakers must address ^{[3] [1] [2]}.

Limitations and final point: reporting and studies cited here are recent snapshots; trends can change quickly. The evidence supports treating the “cold civil war” as a serious analytic frame for political polarization and as a warning about increased endorsement of violence in specific subgroups—but not as proof the United States has entered or will imminently enter a conventional civil war ^{[3] [2]}.