What mechanisms from Cold War arms control could be adapted to U.S.–China crisis management over Taiwan?

1. Hotlines and crisis communication: re-establish direct, high-level channels

During the Cold War, direct leader- and military-to-military lines reduced misperception and allowed rapid de-escalatory signaling; proposals for a U.S.–China emergency hotline between senior leaders and dedicated military-to-military channels draw explicitly on that precedent and were discussed in recent diplomatic rounds ^{[4] [1]}. Practical precedents exist: the two sides negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding annex on notification of major military activities and air-encounter rules in 2015, showing that tailored communication protocols are feasible even now ^[2]. Opponents warn that hotlines are only useful when both sides trust the channel and will act on its warnings, a condition limited by political pressures and domestic audiences on both sides ^[3].

2. Risk Reduction Centers and routine notification mechanisms

Cold War Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) institutionalized automated notifications to prevent accidental escalation; scholars and policy papers recommend analogous centers or standing offices for timely notification of large-scale exercises, carrier transits, and missile tests around Taiwan to remove ambiguity about intent ^{[5] [2]}. The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and later encounters underlined how surprise missile firings and carrier deployments can spiral, and notification regimes could lower that risk by providing predictable information flows ^{[6] [2]}. Critics caution that notifications risk normalizing provocative activities or being gamed for signaling, so verification and limits on scope matter ^[3].

3. Rules of the road for air and maritime encounters: expand and operationalize existing agreements

Cold War rules governing intercepts and close approaches reduced dangerous maneuvers; the United States and China already negotiated an annex on air encounters and rules of behavior for safety of air and maritime encounters, which offers a starting point for a more binding, practiced “rules of the road” regime in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding seas ^{[2] [1]}. Real-world testing — joint exercises in deconfliction, standardized reporting formats, and penalties for violations — would institutionalize norms and reduce incidents like collisions or forced boardings that trigger crises ^[1]. Beijing’s greater sensitivity about sovereignty and Washington’s strategic ambiguity make agreement politically fraught, and Chinese commentators argue the agenda must also include opposing “Taiwan independence” and respect for established communiqués to succeed ^[7].

4. Confidence-building through transparency in capabilities and limits on certain systems

Cold War arms control sometimes took the form of capability limits or transparency measures; contemporary analysts urge narrower, practicable transparency steps — exchanges on doctrine for unmanned systems, black-box data-sharing about missile trajectories, or tacit limits on certain deployments near Taiwan — rather than grand multilateral arms treaties that China is unlikely to accept ^{[4] [1]}. The Stimson and RAND studies recommend starting with modest, verifiable arrangements tied to crisis stability rather than sweeping reductions, noting China’s limited experience with nuclear-risk reduction and current tripartite strategic dynamics involving Russia ^{[4] [1]}. Opponents worry transparency could erode deterrence or be used strategically by one side, highlighting the need for reciprocal and calibrated measures ^[4].

5. Institutional obstacles and a realistic pathway forward

Structural asymmetries, contested maritime claims, and political imperatives — including Congressional actions on arms sales and domestic narratives in China — create real limits to Cold War-style bargains and mean confidence-building must proceed incrementally through existing dialogue channels and defense contacts ^{[3] [8]}. Multiple analysts urge immediate steps: restore military-to-military exchanges, implement existing annexes fully, pilot notification centers, and test hotline protocols while acknowledging that progress will be episodic and contingent on broader political signals ^{[2] [7]}. Reporting limitations prevent definitive judgement on all operational details; nonetheless the evidence supports a pragmatic, phased adaptation of Cold War mechanisms tailored to the asymmetric, multipolar, and sovereignty-sensitive reality of the Taiwan Strait ^{[1] [3]}.