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How do Border Patrol encounter statistics compare between the Trump, Biden, and Obama administrations (annual totals and monthly trends)?

Checked on November 25, 2025
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Executive summary

Border Patrol “encounters” rose sharply under President Biden—peaking in 2022–2023 with annual totals in the millions—and fell to record lows after Trump returned to office in 2025, according to CBP and DHS statements and multiple analyses (e.g., Biden-era ~11 million CBP encounters total reported over four years and monthly peaks above 300,000; March–June 2025 monthly southwest apprehensions around 6–8k and nationwide encounters as low as ~25k) [1] [2] [3] [4]. Available sources show large differences in annual totals and clear monthly trend swings, but they come from agency releases and partisan fact sheets with different emphases, and independent analysts note contributing policy and international factors [5] [6].

1. Big-picture annual totals: Biden’s high, Trump 1.0 mixed, Trump 2.0 historic lows

CBP and secondary reporting indicate the Biden administration presided over historically large encounter totals—CBP/DHS messaging cites roughly 11 million nationwide encounters across Biden’s four years and other tallies put Southwest encounters in the millions in 2021–2023—whereas DHS and CBP in 2025 report the lowest fiscal-year Border Patrol apprehensions since 1970 and vastly smaller totals in FY2025 so far [1] [2] [7]. Independent trackers and media give context that 2022–2023 saw peaks (over 2.2 million Border Patrol apprehensions in 2022 by some counts) while 2025 monthly and YTD numbers are far lower [8] [7].

2. Monthly trends: dramatic spike then steep decline, with identifiable inflection points

Monthly CBP releases show a steep rise through 2021–2023 with peak months above 200k–300k encounters (e.g., December 2023 >249k reported by trackers), followed by declines beginning in 2024 after policy changes and Mexican enforcement cooperation, and then a steeper fall after Trump’s January 2025 actions—monthly southwest Border Patrol apprehensions in early 2025 are reported at roughly 7–9k (March–May 2025) and nationwide encounters hit record lows around 24–26k in mid‑2025 [9] [5] [4] [10] [3].

3. What the numbers measure—and what they don’t

“Encounters” combine Border Patrol Title‑8 apprehensions, Office of Field Operations inadmissibles, and Title 42 expulsions in CBP public datasets; monthly totals reflect encounters, not unique individuals, and can double-count repeat crossings or exclude “gotaways” (people seen but not apprehended) [11] [12] [6]. CBP’s public dashboards are the primary data source; DHS and White House releases emphasize selected metrics (releases, apprehensions, monthly lows) while third parties stress limitations like gotaways and policy-driven classification changes [11] [13] [6].

4. Policy and enforcement drivers behind the swings

Multiple sources link trend inflections to policy: Title 42 expulsions (March 2020–May 2023) altered how encounters were processed; Biden-era parole programs and the CBP One app influenced flows; Mexico’s stepped-up enforcement and specific U.S. rules (e.g., June 2024 Secure the Border) reduced irregular arrivals; Trump’s 2025 executive actions, mass deportation plans, and halting of parole programs correlated with rapid declines in encounters [9] [5] [14] [15] [16].

5. Competing narratives and partisan framing

DHS/CBP and White House releases under Trump present 2025 figures as “historic lows” and proof of restored control, highlighting metrics like “zero releases” and lowest monthly encounters in agency history [3] [17] [18]. Critics and independent analysts (Migration Policy Institute, news outlets) stress that declines partly reflect policy changes, Mexico’s enforcement and terminated humanitarian pathways, and note earlier downward momentum initiated in 2024—arguing 2025 lows are continuation plus further policy tightening rather than a single-administration miracle [5] [19].

6. Limitations and what reporting leaves out

Available sources do not provide a single, reconciled dataset in this collection that lists complete side‑by‑side annual totals for Obama, Trump (2017–2020), Biden (2021–2024) and Trump [20] in one table; they also vary in whether they emphasize CBP “encounters,” USBP apprehensions, expulsions, or deportations, and differ on counting Title 42 and parole admissions [11] [21] [22]. Gotaways, net migration (who stays), and the role of repeat crossers remain noted caveats in CBP methodology and in outside analyses [6] [13].

7. Bottom line for readers

The provided reporting shows clear, large differences: encounters surged in 2021–2023 under Biden to multi‑million annual totals and high monthly peaks; by 2025 CBP and DHS report monthly and fiscal-year numbers at historic lows after policy shifts and international cooperation. Interpretations differ—administration statements credit enforcement and policy, while independent analysts emphasize multiple causes and data limitations—so any conclusion should weigh both the raw CBP numbers (encounters/apprehensions) and the metadata about how those numbers were produced and changed over time [1] [5] [11].

Want to dive deeper?
How did DHS/CBP define and count 'encounters' across the Trump, Biden, and Obama administrations?
What were annual Border Patrol encounter totals by fiscal year under Obama (2009-2016), Trump (2017-2020), and Biden (2021-2025)?
How do monthly encounter trends compare seasonally and during major policy shifts (e.g., Title 42, Remain in Mexico) across administrations?
How did enforcement policies, prosecutorial practices, and resource allocation affect encounter numbers and classifications under each administration?
What role did external factors—regional migration drivers, asylum flows, and U.S.-Mexico cooperation—play in year-to-year encounter changes?