What legislative pathways (funding riders, discharge petitions, expedited procedures) could Congress use to force a review or reversal?

1. Riders on must‑pass funding bills: stealth power to constrain agencies

Congress routinely tries to change or block executive action by inserting riders—provisions limiting how appropriated funds may be used—into appropriations or continuing resolution (CR) packages, especially “must‑pass” bills where the threat of a shutdown gives leverage; riders can either forbid agencies from spending money on certain activities or attempt to alter permanent law, and while House and Senate rules formally bar some riders, they regularly slip into omnibus bills via procedural workarounds ^{[5] [6] [7]}. Advocates say limitation riders are a legitimate exercise of Article I power to control spending; critics call them stealth lawmaking that evades transparent debate and can micromanage agencies ^{[8] [7]}. Past riders (e.g., Hyde Amendment, FCC and SEC riders) show both utility and controversy; the practice succeeds only when leadership can assemble a winning coalition and negotiate around presidential preferences ^{[8] [5]}.

2. The Congressional Review Act: the fastest statutory reversal for rules

For agency rules specifically, the Congressional Review Act (CRA) offers a clear, statutory fast lane: Congress has 60 session days after a rule’s submission to disapprove it by joint resolution, and CRA procedures limit debate and effectively bar a Senate filibuster for such disapprovals—making reversal politically and procedurally easier than ordinary legislation ^{[1] [9]}. The CRA’s scope is rule‑specific and timing‑sensitive; it only applies to rules that are “submitted” and within the 60 session‑day window, and can’t be used retroactively on rules outside that period without invoking ad hoc procedures that Congress sometimes employs or challenges via GAO determinations ^{[4] [9]}. The CRA’s effectiveness depends on whether a majority in both chambers and the president will sign or override a veto—so its expedited floor mechanics do not eliminate ordinary political constraints ^[1].

3. Statutory expedited procedures and special review windows

Congress has enacted various expedited legislative procedures into law for discrete categories—e.g., the National Emergencies Act includes a six‑month congressional review and special procedures to consider termination of an emergency, and other statutes create 30‑ or 60‑day windows and “fast‑track” rules for disapproval or approval of agency actions or presidential recommendations ^{[2] [3]}. These special procedures are narrow by design: they apply only to the kinds of actions and timeframes those statutes specify, and the house covered by the expedited procedure can still choose to waive, amend, or ignore those procedures if its majority decides ^{[10] [11]}. Legal commentators emphasize that expedited procedures speed consideration but do not erase constitutional or political constraints such as presidential veto and public opinion ^{[12] [13]}.

4. Discharge petitions, floor rules, and leadership maneuvers: procedural escape hatches

When leadership stalls a bill, House members can use a discharge petition to force a floor vote on a bill reported from committee—but discharge petitions require 218 signatures and are politically difficult to carry out. More generally, the House Rules Committee can issue a special rule to fast‑track consideration or waive points of order; similarly, the Senate can use unanimous consent agreements or motions to proceed and cloture to shape debate ^{[11] [10]}. These are internal, chamber‑level levers: they can speed or compel consideration but do not change substantive law on their own, and they still confront the same majorities needed to pass and send a measure to the president ^[14].

5. Practical limits and strategic tradeoffs

Every route Congress can use is bounded by scope, timing, and politics. Riders are powerful yet opaque and risk raising separation‑of‑powers fights or provoking vetoes; the CRA is quick but limited to “rules” within its 60 session‑day window; expedited procedures are narrow and statutory; and discharge petitions or floor maneuvers can force votes but require large coalitions and expose members to political costs ^{[6] [1] [3]}. Sources emphasize that Congress often weighs whether to pursue a statutory override, appropriations pressure, or litigation and oversight—each path trades speed for legal durability or public visibility ^{[15] [13]}.

If you want, I can map these pathways against a specific executive action you have in mind and show which options the available authorities would actually cover; current reporting does not mention that specific action unless you provide it. Available sources do not mention a single, catch‑all mechanism that lets Congress instantaneously undo any executive decision.