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What role does Congress's reconsideration vote play under Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution?
Executive summary
The reconsideration vote in Article I, Section 7 lets Congress respond to a presidential veto: if the President returns a bill with objections, the originating chamber must "reconsider" it and, if two‑thirds of that House agree, send it with the objections to the other House for the same two‑thirds vote to become law over the veto (text reproduced across official commentaries) [1]. The clause also requires recorded yeas and nays and frames a 10‑day presentment period and an adjournment‑based pocket veto exception that affect how, when, and whether reconsideration can proceed [2] [3].
1. What the Constitution actually prescribes: a built‑in override mechanism
Article I, Section 7 creates a three‑step loop: present the bill to the President; if he returns it with objections the originating House enters the objections on its journal and "proceed[s] to reconsider" the bill; if two‑thirds of that House agree to pass it, the bill and objections go to the other House, which must likewise repass by two‑thirds to enact the law over the veto (this process and the requirement that yeas and nays be entered on the journal are stated in the clause and annotated explanations) [1] [4].
2. Reconsideration is a political and procedural act, not merely rhetorical
The Constitution’s text ties reconsideration to concrete voting thresholds and formal recordkeeping: the two‑thirds requirement in each chamber is the constitutional standard for overriding a veto, and the names of those voting must be entered in the journals — a transparency and accountability device that makes the reconsideration vote decisive and public [1] [4].
3. Timing matters: the ten‑day window and the pocket veto exception
Presentment rules include a 10‑day (Sundays excepted) period for the President to sign or return a bill; if Congress adjourns in a way that prevents return, the bill does not become law (the so‑called pocket veto). Courts have interpreted those timing rules as protective of both presidential opportunity to act and Congress’s opportunity to reconsider and override if votes permit — meaning that whether reconsideration can occur sometimes depends on procedural calendar and recess questions [2] [3].
4. Legal interpretations shape how reconsideration is applied in practice
Judicial commentary and constitutional annotation emphasize two goals: safeguarding the President’s opportunity to object and ensuring Congress has a "suitable opportunity" to consider those objections and, if supported by the votes, pass the bill over the veto. Courts have read the clause to require opportunity for prompt reconsideration after temporary recesses and have defined the two‑thirds threshold in relation to a quorum in each chamber [3] [2].
5. Reconsideration’s political leverage and institutional dynamics
Reconsideration is both a remedy and a pressure point: a successful two‑thirds repassage defeats a veto, but the high supermajority makes overrides rare, turning reconsideration into a negotiating moment between the President and Congress. The constitutional recordkeeping requirement (yeas and nays entered on the journal) raises the political costs for individual lawmakers by publicly recording override votes [1].
6. Limits and areas not fully resolved by the cited sources
Available sources do not mention detailed modern examples of how specific reconsideration votes were scheduled or litigated in narrowly timed adjournments, nor do they provide empirical counts of override attempts and successes in recent decades — those data are not in the materials provided (not found in current reporting). The sources do show, however, that legal scholarship has debated related presentment topics such as the reach of the Presentment/ORV Clause and the status of other legislative devices, indicating contested readings beyond the core veto‑override rule [5].
7. Competing perspectives and implicit agendas in commentary
Official annotations (Library of Congress, Constitution Annotated) and educational summaries (Annenberg, LII) present the clause as balancing presidential and legislative roles while protecting transparency and opportunity for override [4] [6] [3]. Scholarly work cited in the Constitution Center item highlights originalist and textualist debates about presentment and related clauses, reflecting an academic agenda to reinterpret procedural text and sometimes challenge prior Supreme Court reasoning — an interpretive lens rather than a neutral restatement of practice [5].
8. Bottom line for readers and practitioners
Reconsideration under Article I, Section 7 is a constitutionally mandated, recorded vote with a two‑thirds override threshold in each House that operates inside strict timing rules (including the 10‑day presentment and pocket veto mechanics). It is both a legal pathway to override the President and a political inflection point; outcomes depend on institutional calendar, quorums, and the ability to marshal supermajorities [1] [2] [3].