How did legal scholars interpret the constitutional basis for the third article of impeachment?
Executive summary
Legal scholars reading the Constitution treated the third article of impeachment not as a narrow criminal-count but as an assertion of the House’s political-remedial power to police abuses of office—including obstruction of congressional inquiries and refusal to comply with subpoenas—grounded in historical practice and the Framers’ broad “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” language rather than strict indictability under criminal law [1] [2]. Dissenting scholars, however, insisted that textual signals in the Constitution and related provisions (pardon and jury-trial clauses) counsel restraint and favor an interpretation tied closer to indictable offenses [3].
1. The House’s third article framed as abuse of power and refusal to obey subpoenas, not a conventional crime
When congressional committees drafted the third article—most clearly visible in the Nixon-era precedents—the Committee on the Judiciary treated it as charging a course of conduct constituting an abuse of presidential power and a direct obstruction of the House’s inquiry by withholding subpoenaed materials, concluding that impeachment need not be limited to crimes indictable in court [1]. Deschler’s compilation and the Committee’s report explicitly describe article III as grounded in the President’s interposition of executive judgment against lawful subpoenas, thereby “assuming to himself functions” that frustrated the House’s constitutional role [1].
2. Historical and doctrinal anchors: “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” as political, capacious language
Major strands of scholarship and the Constitution Annotated emphasize that the Framers used “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” to encompass political offenses—usurpation, gross neglect, and abuses of trust—that cannot be fully captured by existing criminal statutes, and that impeachment meaning has been shaped by congressional practice over time [2] [4]. Legal historians from Joseph Story onward argued that the scope of impeachable behavior was intentionally enlarged to include conduct “of a political character,” a view courts have deferred to by treating impeachment as a political question largely outside judicial management [4] [5].
3. Counterargument: textual cues and a plea for criminal-law boundaries
A persistent minority of scholars reads textual cross-references—such as the Constitution’s mention of pardons for “Offenses against the United States” and the jury-trial clause that excepts impeachments—to suggest that impeachment should align with criminal categories and indictability; proponents of this view urge that the Framers did not intend impeachment to be untethered from recognizable offenses [3]. That legalistic strand resurfaced in debates over Clinton-era impeachment, where the House pursued discrete criminal charges (perjury, obstruction) rather than broad political misconduct, demonstrating an alternative, crime-centric approach to the constitutional basis for articles [6].
4. Institutional practice and the judiciary’s hands-off posture
Scholars point to the Senate’s historical role and to Supreme Court jurisprudence—most notably Nixon v. United States—as evidence that the Constitution entrusts impeachment procedures and the scope of offenses to Congress; the courts will not substitute judicial standards for the Senate’s constitutional “sole” power to try impeachments, leaving definitional authority to political branches and historical norms [7] [8]. The constitutional text’s silence on precise definitions and the documented reluctance of courts to impose judicially manageable rules bolster the scholarly interpretation that article III-type charges rest on congressional judgment about political trust and institutional preservation [5] [9].
5. Practical implications and unresolved lines of debate
Legal scholars therefore converge on the practical conclusion that an article like the third—charging obstruction of Congress and abuse of executive authority—has a credible constitutional basis whether viewed as a political offense rooted in Framers’ intent and practice or as a hybrid that sits at the intersection of political accountability and criminality; the debate persists, however, over limits and the risk of politicizing removal absent clear indictable conduct, a tension reflected in competing scholarly camps and in how particular Houses have chosen to frame charges [1] [6] [3]. The reporting reviewed does not resolve which interpretation the Framers would prefer in every case; it documents instead the institutional choices and doctrinal fault lines that inform scholars’ competing readings [2] [4].