What are the constitutional qualifications for serving in the U.S. House of Representatives and how have they been interpreted?

1. The written rule: a short, negative list the Framers chose intentionally

Article I, Section 2 sets only three disqualifications—age, citizenship duration, and state inhabitancy at election—reflecting the Framers’ intent to keep barriers low so the people could choose their representatives, a design explicitly recorded in the House’s historical summary ^{[1] [2]}. Contemporary explanations of the Clause emphasize that the age and seven‑year citizenship thresholds were meant to ensure maturity and loyalty while permitting naturalized citizens to serve ^{[3] [6]}.

2. Timing and practical interpretation: when must those boxes be checked?

Congressional practice and later annotations have consistently interpreted the age and citizenship requirements as qualifications to hold office, not as disqualifications that must be met at the time of election, so persons elected while technically ineligible can be seated once they satisfy those thresholds and take the oath (examples and practice summarized in Hinds and the Constitution Annotated) ^{[3] [4] [7]}. The Library of Congress and other legal summaries note specific historical instances—such as Members who waited to be sworn until they reached the required age—supporting that practice ^{[3] [1]}.

3. Who decides eligibility: the House’s power and the judicial constraint

The Constitution vests each House with authority to judge the “Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members,” and the House has historically exercised discretion to admit or exclude contested Members (Art. I, §5; ^[2]; p1_s1). But that power is not unlimited: judicial and scholarly treatments caution against wholesale substitution of the House’s preferences for the Constitution’s explicit text, and the Supreme Court has narrowed congressional exclusion where it would frustrate voters’ choice—principles reflected in modern annotations and case discussions ^{[8] [7] [4]}.

4. The debate over extra qualifications: states, Congress, and term limits

A recurring constitutional flashpoint is whether states or Congress may impose additional, “reasonable” qualifications beyond the three listed in Article I; Hinds’ Precedents records arguments that the Constitution enumerated disqualifications and left other powers to states, while later jurisprudence and the Court’s invalidation of state‑created term limits have leaned the other way—treating the enumerated qualifications as largely exclusive and rejecting state efforts that effectively alter federal eligibility ^{[9] [5] [4]}. Legal scholars remain divided: some, like Georgetown’s Constitution Center, observe uncertainty and argue historical practice could permit certain additions, while dominant statutory and constitutional readings constrain state innovations ^{[10] [5]}.

5. Practical consequences and illustrative precedents

The short list of constitutional qualifications has practical consequences: it enables relatively young and recently naturalized Americans to serve once constitutional thresholds are met at swearing‑in, limits states from imposing district residency or other added hurdles, and places primary responsibility for contested seating with the House—though judicial oversight protects voters’ choice where exclusion would exceed constitutional authority (historical seating of William Claiborne and the delayed oath of John Young Brown are recorded examples) ^{[1] [3] [7]}. Where the record is silent in the provided sources—on every recent litigated contest or on fine‑grained doctrinal distinctions—this account relies on the authoritative summaries and precedents cited above rather than unsupported assertions ^{[4] [5]}.