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What did the Constitution say about religious tests in 1787 and afterward?

Checked on November 5, 2025
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Executive Summary

The Constitution’s Article VI, adopted by the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, prohibits any religious test as a qualification for federal office, establishing a national rule against religious tests even as many states retained them [1] [2]. Subsequent practice and litigation — most notably the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause in 1791 and the Supreme Court’s Torcaso v. Watkins decision in 1961 — extended the practical ban on religious tests to state offices, though several state constitutions still contain unenforceable religious-test language [3] [4] [5].

1. How the Framers wrote the ban and why it mattered then

Article VI’s clause that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States” was proposed by Charles Pinckney and adopted in August 1787, reflecting a deliberate federal decision to bar religious tests for national officeholders. This federal prohibition contrasted with the status quo in many states: nine states still had explicit religious tests in their constitutions during the ratification debates, which fueled controversy about whether the new national government would tolerate state religious requirements [2] [3]. Framers such as James Madison argued that formal religious tests were unnecessary because the constitutionally required oath to support the Constitution would screen officeholders; opponents worried that the federal ban would allow non-Christians to hold national office, revealing the tension between republican inclusion and prevailing sectarian expectations [1].

2. Early practice: oaths, “So help me God,” and unresolved ambiguities

After ratification, Congress enacted oath statutes but left open whether invocations of God in ceremonial language created a de facto religious test. The first Congress prescribed oaths that did not mention God, yet subsequent practice — including the Judiciary Act of 1789 adding the phrase “So help me God” to judicial oaths and its later adoption in presidential ceremonies — raised questions about whether religious language in oath administration effectively reintroduced a test by social pressure [1]. Supporters who feared exclusion of non-Christians pointed to this ceremonial language as problematic, while defenders argued that optional or ceremonial phrasing did not equate to a constitutional qualification; the historical record shows this tension persisted without definitive early judicial resolution [6].

3. The First Amendment and the evolving federal-state separation

The Bill of Rights reinforced limits on religious power in federal law by forbidding Congress from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion” in 1791, which strengthened the constitutional architecture that undermined religious tests as instruments of government exclusion [3]. Although Article VI already barred tests for federal office, the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause clarified federal hostility to government-imposed religion, narrowing space for tests or qualifications that favored particular faiths. Debates at the time show that federal leaders like Washington and Adams publicly endorsed religion’s civic value even while the text prohibited formal religious qualifications, making clear that cultural religiosity and constitutional secularism coexisted and sometimes conflicted in early American politics [3].

4. The Court’s role and the nationalization of the ban in 1961

State constitutions continued to contain religious-test provisions long after the federal ban, but the Supreme Court finally rendered those provisions unenforceable in Torcaso v. Watkins [7]. Torcaso held that states cannot impose religious tests for public office because such requirements violate the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty, effectively nationalizing constitutional protections against religious qualifications [4] [5]. Even so, the existence of archaic language in eight or more state constitutions illustrates the gap between text and practice: the Court’s ruling eliminated legal force, but not the symbolic or political resonance, of state-level religious-test provisions [4].

5. What remains contested or overlooked in the historical record

Historians highlight several continuing ambiguities: whether ceremonial oath language like “So help me God” functions as coercive in practice, how much the framers intended Article VI to influence states, and why some states left religious-test language on the books despite its unenforceability [1] [5]. Different actors advanced competing agendas—framers who sought secular qualifications, advocates who wanted Christian-only officeholders, and later political actors who preserved religious rhetoric—so the constitutional rule against religious tests must be read alongside political practices, statutory oaths, and judicial rulings that together shaped actual access to public office over time [1] [6].

Want to dive deeper?
What did Article VI of the U.S. Constitution say about religious tests in 1787?
How did the First Congress and early states interpret the no-religious-test clause in 1789-1790?
Did any states have religious tests after 1787 and when were they eliminated?
How did the Constitutional Convention debate religious tests in 1787?
What Supreme Court cases have interpreted the Constitution's ban on religious tests (e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins 1961)?